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Preface 
One of the most important questions relating to global sustainability per-
tains to the nature of the future development paths followed by LDCs. 
Their future contribution to global environmental stresses may become so 
dominant as to make unilateral courses of action by individual (group of) 
countries unviable. Certainly, population growth is one of the key vari-
ables in this context. However, another important factor to consider is 
whether a worldwide homogenization of life styles and resource consump-
tion levels along the past energy and resource intensive historical develop-
ment path of industrialized countries will take place. 
This paper argues that the next phase of development may be 
different from the past. Future economic growth and development may 
depend more on the introduction and widespread diffusion of new activities 
which add value with less energy and material inputs and thus have 
smaller environmental impacts than traditional smoke-stack development 
strategies. The authors consider that developing countries may even have 
a strategic advantage in the transition to such a new mode of development 
because they are less committed in terms of their capital vintage structure, 
their management practices, and lifestyles, to the previous development 
model. The arguments and empirical evidence assembled here indicate the 
broad direction and characteristics of such a new development phase. 
There are reasons to be cautiously optimistic; given that appropriate poli-
cies are implemented a transition to a sustainable development path may 
not only be feasible, but also be consistent with historical experience. 
However, the authors refer also to a "hidden agenda" that goes 
beyond the dimensions of pure economic and technological restructuring. 
They caution against the frequently postulated short-term global conver-
gence tendencies. They also indicate the importance of the social and 
institutional embedding of environmentally compatible technologies and 
economic activities and emphasize the role of science and technology policy 
in making the best use of the opportunity windows that occur in the tran-
sition to a new phase of development. As such, the paper provides back-
ground for further discussion and analysis of the general problematique 
addressed by the Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies {ECS) 
Project at IIASA. 
BO R. DOOS 
Leader 
Environment Program 
NEBOJSA NAKICENOVIC 
Project Leader 
Environmentally Compatible 
Energy Strategies Project 
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Abstract: This paper takes a long-term view on economic growth from an 
essentially Schumpeteriim perspective. The authors consider that since the e?.rly 
1970s we have been witnessing a volatile and turbulent transition towards a new 
phase of socio-economic development, in which the diffusion of a host of inter-
related new technologies, institutions and forms of organization could lead to 
a renewed period of economic growth and prosperity . They argue that the 
beginning of such a diffusion phase , in which the ultimate characteristics of the 
future development trajectory are being shaped, could constitute an opportunity 
window for reducing the disparities between countries as a result of their different 
degrees of economic development. They consider in addition that the successful 
catching-up will depend more on an effective introduction and diffusion of the 
elements of the emerging new development regime than on a growth model along 
the trajectories and intensity level of the previous model of development. 
Keywords: economic growth; global development; Kondratiev upswing; 
Schumpeterian growth model; structural adjustments; diffusion of technology ; 
energy; transport; communications; developing countries; technology transfer. 
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Resume: Cet article est un analyse a long terme de la croissance economique 
vue dans une perspective essentiellement Schumpeterienne. Les auteurs 
considerent que depuis le debut des annees 70, nous avons vecu une periode 
de transition turbulente vers une nouvelle phase de developpement socio-
economique, ou la diffusion d'une multitude de technologies, d'institutions et 
de formes d'organisation nouvelles pourrait amener une nouvelle periode de 
croissance economique et de prosperite. Ils soutiennent que le commencement 
de cette phase de diffusion, ou la trajectoire du developpement futur prends sa 
forme, pourrait constituer une opportunite permettant de reduire !es disparites 
entre !es pays ayant atteint des niveaux differents de developpement econornique. 
Ils pensent en outre, que la reussite du rattrapage dependra davantage de 
!' introduction et de la diffusion effective des elements du nouveau regime de 
developpement que d'un modele de croissance suivant !es trajectoires et !es 
niveaux d'intensite realise avec le modele de developpement anterieur. 
Mots-cles: croissance economique; developpement mondial ; essor 
Kondratievien; modele de croissance Schumpeterien; adjustements structuraux; 
diffusion de la technologie; energie ; transports ; communications; pays en voie 
de developpement; transfert de la technologie. 
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Beitrag liefert eine Langzeitstudie des 
Wirtschaftwachstums aus einer im wesentlichen Schumpeterschen Perspektive. 
Die Autoren sind der Auffassung , daB wir seit den friihen 70iger Jahren Zeugen 
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eines erratischen und turbulenten Uberganges zu einer neuen Phase der 
soziookonomischen Entwicklung sind, in welcher die Diffusion eines Biindels 
independter neuer Technologien, Institutionen und Organisationsformen zu einer 
erneuerten Periode des okonomischen Wachstums und der Prosperitiit fiihren 
konnte. Der Beginn einer solchen Diffusionsphase, wlihrend der sich die 
elementaren Charakteristiken der Wege der zukiinftigen Entwicklungspflade 
herausbilden, konnte ein mogliches Fenster zur Reduktion der zufolge der 
unterschiedlichen Grade der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung zwischen Staaten 
darstellen. Uberdies sind sie der Auffassung, daB das erfolgreiche Aufholen mehr 
von der effektiven Einfiihrung und Verbreitung der Elemente des neuen 
Entwicklungsbereiches abhlingen , als von einem Wachstumsmodell, welches auf 
den Trajektorien und lntensivitlitsnivaus des vergangenen Entwicklungsmodelles 
beruht. 
Sachworter: Wirtschaftswachstum; globale Entwicklung; Kondratieff; 
Aufschwung; Schumpetersches Wachstumsmodell; strukturelle Anpassung; 
Technologiediffusion; Energie; Transport; Kommunikation; Entwicklungslander; 
Technologietransfer. 
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" Add as many mail-coaches as you please, you will never get a railroad 
by so doing." Joseph A. Schumpeter, 1935 [!] 
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In this paper we take a long-term view of economic growth from an essentially 
Schumpeterian perspective. We consider that since the early 1970s we are witnessing a 
volatile and turbulent transitional period towards a new phase of socio-economic 
development, in which the diffusion of a host of inter-related new technologies, institutions 
and forms of organization could lead to a renewed period of economic growth and 
prosperity . We argue that the beginning of such a d iffusion phase , in which the ultimate 
characteristics of the future development trajectory are being shaped , could constitute an 
opportunity window for reducing disparities between countries as a result o f their different 
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degrees of economic development. We consider, in addition, that successful catching-up 
will depend more on an effective introduction and difussion of the elements of the emerging 
new development regime than on a growth model along the trajectories and intensity levels 
of the previous model of economic development, i.e. an argument following the powerful 
lines of Schumpeter, quoted above. 
Examples of emerging technological elements in the area of energy and transport and 
communication technologies will be outlined. The importance of integration into 
international flows of technical knowledge, skills and capital in order to most effectively 
make use of the growth (and catching-up) opportunities opened up by the diffusion of a 
new socio-technical 'bandwagon' will be sketched out. On the basis of historical examples, 
we will try to support the argument that heterogeneity both in the socio-technological options 
as well as in the ultimate intensity (diffusion, or resource consumption) levels was and 
will continue to be an essential factor to be kept in mind when elaborating scenarios and 
policies, particularly for developing countries. As such, we refute the prescriptive character 
of some scenarios which are based on the implicit assumption that diffusion and resulting 
resource consumption levels realised in a previous expansion phase are realistic (even 
desirable) targets for followers at later times. Heterogeneity in the ultimate realisation 
levels of a new socio-technic development phase also has important repercussions on our 
perception of future sustainability, which is often perceived as being threatened in scenarios 
assuming strong homogenization in development patterns, lifestyles and resource 
consumption levels. 
1 Structural adjustments and the emergence of a new socio-technical 
development phase 
The evolutionary path of successive replacements of traditional by new forms of 
development and economic growth, driven by the diffusion of technologies and institutions, 
and interlaced by economic restructuring and transformations in social relations is captured 
in Schumpeter's 1939 [2] notion of long waves in economic development- i.e. a seesaw-
like pattern of Kondratiev [3] pulses of expansionary and recessionary (restructuring) 
periods experienced in market economies during the last two centuries. Rather than a process 
of continuous growth, long-wave theory supports the idea that growth itself comes in pulses 
stimulated by the appearance and widespread diffusion of social, institutional and 
technological innovations, leading to new forms of organization of production, new 
products, new infrastructures and even whole new industries. 
In the work of Freeman [4], Freeman and Perez [5], Mensch [6], Marchetti [7], 
Nakicenovic [8] among many other authors, the conceptual and empirical description of 
long waves, diffusion, invention and innovation processes have been laid, albeit from 
different methodological and theoretical perspectives [9]. Within a Schumpeterian notion 
of the importance of innovations we emphasize in particular the discontinuous nature in 
which innovations are introduced and especially how they diffuse (become embedded) into 
the economic and social system. 
One should note in this context that innovations have to be defined in a broader sense 
than technology (i .e. product and process innovations) alone, as the growth potential of 
an inter-related set of technological innovations and associated 'best' engineering and 
management practices (i .e. a technological 'trajectory' in the sense of Dosi [10]) can only 
be realised in conjunction with new organizational forms in production and social relations 
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as well as new skill levels. The inter-relatedness of both the technological and the 
social/institutional innovations enabling major economic upturns and explaining their 
pervasive effects throughout the economy and society is captured in the concept of a 'techno-
economic paradigm' as discussed by Perez [11] and Freeman and Perez [5]. 
Along a similar line we consider in the present context that a set of inter-related social 
and technical innovations drives particular historic economic expansion periods. In each 
of such particular development phases a synergetic aggregate of major technological and 
organizational innovations and the direction along which economic growth takes place 
enables an expansion of the levels of productivity and allows greater economic development 
than was possible (sustainable) under a previous development regime. 
Such a new development regime emerges, however, only through a process of 
restructuring in response to the saturation of the growth potential of the previously dominant 
form and direction of economic growth, i.e. in response to the fact that a particular phase 
of economic expansion approaches a number of limits (market, environmental, social 
acceptance, etc.) and becomes increasingly characterized by diminishing returns and an 
accelerating pattern of incremental innovations [ 12]. 
A new development (growth) regime thus enables the limits of market saturation to 
be overcome and allows further productivity increases of the previous dominant mode 
of economic growth and development. The full-scale realisation of the growth potentials 
opened in a new development phase is however conditional on a process of restructuring, 
involving in-depth and far-reaching social and institutional changes. It also entails the 
development of new technologies and products, the rise and decline of entire industries 
and infrastructures, changes in the international location of industries, and technological 
leadership. The transition to a new development (growth) regime calls for transformations 
in the skills and composition of the workforce, the education and training system, the system 
of industrial relations, structure (e.g. level of integration) of enterprises, production and 
management 'styles' and practices, and the international trading and financial system, among 
others. It is via the widespread diffusion of new technologies, products and institutions 
shaping a new development regime that an economic upturn and a prolonged period of 
economic growth is made possible. The final form of the elements and structure of a new 
development regime, as well as the time-span within which the required restructuring is 
effected to permit a new expansionary phase, will in turn depend upon the interests, actions, 
relative strength and the interplay between the social forces involved in its formation. 
From a long-term perspective it appears that Kondratiev cycles as a model of the 
discontinuous nature of economic development - i.e . a succession of periods of regular 
expansion and growth interlaced with periods of intensive restructuring (recession , even 
depressions, accompanied by turbulence and volatility in prices, financial markets and 
social relations) - are in principle caused by the discontinuous manner in which technical , 
social and organizational innovations are introduced and become absorbed by the economic 
and social fabric. The coupled dynamics of both the discontinuous introduction and diffusion 
rates of innovations result in strong discontinuities in the long-term economic development , 
where 'boom' periods are followed by 'seasons of saturations' [13], in which a large number 
of innovations, responsible for much of the previous economic growth, reach their market 
and diffusion saturation . Such discontinuities in the long-term economic development 
emerge even without a rigid clustering in either the introduction dates (as originally 
maintained by Mensch [6]) or the saturation periods of the diffusion of innovations. 
Long waves are an international phenomenon , as manifest in a wave-like , broadly 
synchronous, movement of aggregate indicators like the diffusion of technologies, industrial 
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output, prices, etc. As such, we suppose that any macroscopic event affecting simultaneously 
the economic and social evolution of a number of core countries of a particular development 
phase, will most likely have a common causality and will in particular be capable of 
reverberating at a worldwide level, also affecting fringe countries. This does not hold only 
for the growth periods of a Kondratiev cycle, but even more so for the downswing and 
recessionary periods marking the transition between two consecutive growth or development 
regimes . 
It is also argued that, in addition to the saturation phenomena outlined above, the 
depression of a Kondratiev cycle (as distinct from an economic recession) may be triggered 
by a progressive 'mismatch ' [11) between the dynamics of the emerging technological 
elements of a new 'socio-technical paradigm' already existing latently or on a small scale 
during the end of an upswing phase of a Kondratiev cycle, but being effectively barred 
from large-scale diffusion and final realisation of the ultimate technological trajectories 
[14) due to the dominance of the previous 'paradigm', and the dynamics (or rather the 
inertia) of the existing socio-institutional framework supporting it. 
At the same time, the period of restructuring provides an opportunity window for 
followers to catch up, as in the initial formation of a new development regime local skill 
levels can be translated into new value-generating activities and products with relatively 
modest capital outlays , as opposed to the import of capital-intensive mature technologies 
and goods production facilities, say in the form of large-scale integrated steel plants, textile 
industry and so on, considered as traditional areas of comparative advantage of developing 
and newly industrializing countries. Finally, one may even consider that followers have 
a certain strategic advantage in such transition periods as they have no comparable heavy 
commitment in terms of vintage capital structure, infrastructures , levels and composition 
of skills and organizational/institutional settings to the previously dominant (and 
progressively vanishing) mode of economic growth. 
Periods of intense restructuring are especially characterized by increasing volatility 
Figure 1 Energy prices and wholesale price indexes showing periods of stable 
prices and periods of high volatility (restructuring periods) . Source : Nakicenovic [63] 
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in energy and raw material prices (as illustrated in Figure 1 in the case of the USA; the 
speculative character of crude oil spot markets or the price instabilities in the silver market 
may serve here as further illustrative examples) and instabilities in financial markets (e.g . 
the October 1987 crash). These instabilities stem from the emergence and widespread 
application of speculative instruments as a result of a lack of productive investment 
possibilities vis-a-vis saturating traditional markets and the uncertainty about the growth 
potential and ultimate realisation of the elements of a new development phase. This period 
is finally accompanied by structural unemployment as a consequence of market saturation 
in the dominant growth sectors of the previous upswing as well as by increasing tendencies 
for mergers and acquisitions due to the above-mentioned shift in the search for profit 
opportunities away from productive investments. Considering the still significantly higher 
yields attainable in financial markets (see for instance the swift recovery from the October 
1987 crash) and the massive investments into mergers and acquisitions (over $300 billion 
in 1988 in the USA alone) it appears likely that a redirection towards productive investments 
could occur only after large-scale destruction of speculative capital and/or reduction in 
the disparities in yields between financial and productive investments. 
In Table 1 we give an illustrative summary representation of some of the characteristics 
of past development phases underlying each Kondratiev cycle, in terms of principal growth 
sectors (top row in Table 1), emerging technologies that will dominate the next cycle (second 
row) and management and industrial organization principles (bottom two rows). 
2 Elements of a possible new growth phase 
Before we address some of the elements which we consider as characteristic of the emerging 
new development and growth phase of the fifth Kondratiev, let us briefly note some 
Table 1 Characteristics of major economic development phases (Kondratiev cycles). 
Source: Pry [25] 
1770-1830 1820-1890 1880-1945 1935-1995 1985-2050 
Water power Coal Cars Electric power Gas 
Ships Railroads Trucks Oil Nuclear 
Canals Steam power Trolleys Airplanes Information 
Mechanical Chemical industry Radio & TV Telecommunication 
equipment Metallurgical Instruments Sattelite comm. 
processes & controls Laser comm. 
Mechanical Electricity Electronics Nuclear Biotechnology 
equipment Internal Jet engine Computers Artifical 
Coal combustion Air transport Gas intelligence 
Stationary Telegraphy Telecommunication Space comm. 
steam power Steam shipping & transport 
Economy of Administrative Professional Participative and 
scale Management management interconnected 
(Interchangeable (Taylor) systems 
parts) management 
Concept of Concept of Concept of management Concept of Concept of systems 
the industrial mass production structure and delegation decentralization structure 
firm Interchangeable 
Division of parts 
labour 
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important characteristics underlying the growth phase of the fourth Kondratiev , i.e. of 
the post Second World War era. The post-war economic growth phase was associated 
with a cluster of inter-related technical and managerial innovations , leading to productivity 
levels clearly superior to those attainable with previous technologies (primarily based on 
coal and the steam engine) and systems of production organization. In particular , the 
extension of the continuous-flow concept of the chemical industry to the mass production 
of identical units made with energy-intensive materials enabled unprecedented real cost 
and price decreases and thus led to the mass consumption of these products . Examples 
of typical products include the internal combustion engine and the automobile, 
petrochemicals and plastics, and consumer durables , among many others. Petroleum played 
a vital role [15], both in terms of its availability at low real costs, as well as its role as 
the principal energy carrier and feedstock in industry, residential and especially transport 
sectors. The prototype of the associated production organization was the Fordist type of 
assembly line, complemented on the organizational level by a separation of management 
and administration from production along the ideas of Taylor's scientific management. 
This technological 'style' was 'matched' [11] by the social and institutional framework, 
a match which was achieved however only after a period of deep depression and social 
turmoil in the 1930s. Examples of the social-institutional framework associated with the 
growth of the oil-based energy- and material-intensive mass production regime of the post-
war boom include Keynsian policies leading to various forms of demand management, 
both direct via public infrastructure (roads, highways), defence and public service spending 
(in particular health care and higher education) and indirectly, e.g. in the form of income 
redistribution (enabling mass consumption from the disposable income side), generally 
subsumed under the term the 'welfare state'. Other examples include socio-institutional 
innovations such as large-scale consumer credits , publicity , development of mass 
communication, institutional embedding of labour unions or the development of various 
forms of Sozialpartnerschaft as socio-institutional framework of a consensus on the general 
growth trajectory. It is precisely this congruence between technologies and products and 
the (supportive) socio-institutional framework, which was characteristic of the development 
phase that enabled the economic expansion after the Second World War. 
We argue that the above-mentioned 'consensus ' is progressively vanishing, and that 
we are in fact witnessing a widening mismatch between the socio-institutional framework 
of a particular phase of economic growth and the attainment of (market, environmental, 
social acceptance, etc.) limits to its further expansion and the emergence of a new 
development phase as represented in changi:i.g social values, new technologies and growth 
sectors, new forms of production organization, shifts in the occupational profiles and the 
international relative cost advantage. The structural and institutional adjustment processes 
entailed in the transition to a new development phase cannot be treated comprehensively 
within the present paper (a good discussion is for instance provided in the report of the 
'interfutures ' project of OECD [16], and some tentative discussion relative to science policy 
in developing countries is presented in the last chapter of this paper) but their very existence 
is widely recognized and summarized under the heading of various institutional reforms, 
be it deregulation (and re-regulation) , perestroika, crisis of the welfare state and of labour 
unionism, etc. 
In the previous development phase, productivity increases were primarily obtained 
by increasing economies of scale in the mass production of energy- and material-intensive 
products. We argue that in the next phase of economic expansion, criteria of system 
integration, flexibility and quality, environmental compatibility, value- and information-
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intensive (and relatively material- and energy-extensive) products and a production system 
in which the whole philosophy of just-in-time, high turn-round times and inventory 
minimization, unprecedented quality and precision levels, environmental compatibility, 
etc. will become dominant . Unlike in the previous upswing, productivity increases will 
no longer be based on increasing economies of scale, but instead on increasing economies 
of scope. 
In the following three sections of this paper, we discuss tentatively some elements 
of a possible new development (growth) phase, without however going into detail regarding 
the socio-institutional framework that will emerge, once these elements become indeed 
pre-eminent. The areas in which we discuss the emerging new tendencies include the fields 
of energy, manufacturing and finally transport and communication. 
3 Energy 
The area of energy has , due to the extreme price volatility since the beginning of the 1970s, 
been the focus of attention of analysts, policy-makers and the general public. In particular 
the structural transition in the primary energy supply mix with the market dominance of 
petroleum (and the oil producers cartel OPEC) having reached its zenith of importance 
and starting to decline, if only in relative market share terms , and the apparent decoupling 
of energy from general economic growth, have been the most important characteristics 
of the 1970s and 1980s. These shorter-term developments have however somehow masked 
the perspective on the longer-term tendencies in the evolution of the energy system. In 
particular, it was historically never resource scarcity proper which led to the transition 
to new energy carriers, but better compatibility of new energy vectors with the social, 
economic and environmental requirements and boundary conditions of evolving societies. 
It was not the scarcity of wood fuel [ 17] which led to the transition to coal starting in 
the 18th century, and it was not the lack of resources and supply sources which led to 
the transition away from coal to oil, after the middle of the 19th century. The driving 
forces were instead the higher quality, energy density and thus improved possibilities for 
transportation and storage, versatility and ease of use, as well as the emergence of new 
applications, which led to the transition to new forms of energy carriers . 
From a historical perspective, the respective transitions from wood to coal , from coal 
to oil and the present transition away from oil enabled at the same time the achievement 
of ever-higher energy efficiencies and the resolution of urgent environmental issues [ 18]. 
The transition from wood fuel and charcoal to coal resolved the problems of deforestation 
in areas close to the main centres of consumption. It was not until the transition away 
from coal that the famous London smog finally disappeared. The substitution of horses 
as transport by the automobile at the beginning of this century resolved in a similar way 
an urgent problem of urban pollution - horse manure - only in turn to result in a new 
qualitative and quantitative dimension of environmental impacts , which are only just starting 
to be tackled adequately (e.g. by the introduction of catalytic converters on cars) . 
From a long-term perspective the observed 'decoupling ' of energy demand from 
economic growth since the beginning of the 1970s, i.e . the improving energy efficiency 
of economies is far from being a historically unique event. (For the whole of the OECD 
this efficiency improvement since 1973, i.e. energy input per unit of GNP, averaged about 
2 3 per year. Taking 1960 as base year the efficiency improvement corresponds to a rate 
of l 3 per year .) If we account in particular for non-commercial energy carriers (wood 
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and feed) in the total energy balance in the USA since 1800 and examine the energy input 
per value of (constant) GNP generated, we observe a (discontinuous) decrease in the energy 
requirements per unit of GNP with an average rate of 1 % per year over the last 200 years 
(as documented by Nakicenovic [19]). 
From this long-term view, we argue that further increases in the energy efficiency, 
improved environmental compatibility, enhanced system integration and robustness, and 
finally increasing flexibility, safety and quality of energy carriers (for instance by growing 
importance of grid-dependent energy vectors, including electricity), will evolve as principal 
determining factors as opposed to considerations of security and geopolitics and 'Malthusian 
myths' of resource and supply constraints, which were considered as the main future driving 
forces under the impression of the oil shocks of the 1970s. 
These driving forces become especially important under two main tendencies emerging 
from the energy debate. The first lies in the increasing globalization of environmental 
issues, in particular the increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations and the 
possibility of significant climatic changes, as opposed to the more local concerns (urban 
smog) and regional concerns (in particular acid rain) which have been predominant thus 
far in the scientific and policy arena. The second trend (or rather, likely hypothesis) deals 
with the future evolution of energy prices in general and that of oil in particular. We argue 
that the hypothesis that energy price levels will remain relatively low in real-terms over 
the medium-term (e.g. over the next 20 years) no longer appears simply a possibility but 
instead rather likely. This is because of further efficiency improvements in energy use, 
the emergence of value- and information-intensive (as opposed to material- and energy-
intensive) products as principal elements of a possible new economic upswing, as well 
as the considerable potential for further technology improvements (and cost reductions) 
at all steps of the energy chain from exploration, production to end-use. 
As various studies at IIASA have demonstrated (e.g. Griibler and Nakicenovic [20], 
Rogner [21]) there exists considerable growth potential for natural gas and gas-related 
technologies (in particular gas-turbine technology) which appear particularly well suited 
to meet the above-listed requirements. As an illustration, we have assembled in Table 2 
the evolution of the economically and technically recoverable gas reserves for different 
geographical areas since 1970. The most obvious conclusion is that the concept of energy 
reserves and resources has to be considered as a dynamic and not a static one. Whereas 
natural gas reserves accounted in 1970 for only half of the petroleum reserves, they have 
now reached near parity. Reserve-to-production ratios exceed 58 years globally and even 
80 years for non-OPEC developing countries. Since 1970, net reserve additions have grown 
globally nearly three times faster than the increase in gas demand and, as Table 2 illustrates, 
the dynamics of natural gas finds have been particularly noteworthy in developing countries 
(increasing by more than a factor 6 since 1970), despite the relatively modest (in comparison 
with North America and Europe) exploration effort going on in these countries. All told, 
a large potential for further gas finds apparently exists , particularly in those countries not 
endowed with petroleum. Over 100 countries have identified commercially-viable gas 
reserves. However, there are also a number of countries (16 alone in Africa with total 
gas reserves in excess of 900 billion cubic metres of natural gas, i.e. over 90 years the 
present gas production of the African continent, excluding the OPEC members Algeria 
and Nigeria), in which exploitation of identified gas deposits has not yet been started due 
to the lack of an appropriate transport and end-use infrastructure. The lack of appropriate 
infrastructure leads even in some oil-producing developing countries to considerable 
wastage. Nigeria, for instance, flared in 1986 three-quarters of its associated natural gas 
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Table 2 Natural gas reserves and production 1970-1988, in 109 cubic metres . 
Source: CEDIGAZ [58] 
Area Gas reserves' Gas 
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production Ratio 198811970 
1970 1988 1970 1987 Reserves Production 
North America 9236 8040 685 546 0.87 0.80 
West Europe 4118 5416 77 196 l.32 2.55 
USSR and East Europe 9516 42481 232 793 4.46 3.42 
Japan, N .Z ., Australia 560 2469 4 20 4.41 5.00 
OPEC 12619 39870 38 185 3.16 4.87 
Subtotals 36076 98276 1036 1740 2.72 1.68 
---
Non-OPEC developing 2022 12407 41 151 6.14 3.68 
World totals 38098 110683 1077 1891 2.91 I. 76 
---
World : reserve to production ratio 1970: 35 .4 years 1988: 58. 5 years 
Non-OPEC developing countries: R/P 1970: 49 .3 years 1988: 82 .2 years 
Note 1: Reserves as of I January 
production in the absence of facilities for re-injection and a transport infrastructure. 
The large potential contribution of the known gas reserves to the energy balance par-
ticularly of oil importing developing countries is clearly illustrated in Table 3, comparing 
natural gas revserves and production with the energy requirements in terms of commercial 
and total (i.e. including non-commercial) energy requirements. With the exception of Brazil, 
the known reserves are sufficiently large to support increased utilization of natural gas 
and a significant share of gas in the energy balance of these countries. The same can also 
be said for other developing countries, which are presently self-sufficient in oil, or even 
net exporters. Most of them (one notable exception being China) have large natural gas 
reserves, which are only in rare cases starting to be tapped (see Table 4) . The fact that 
many developing countries (particularly in Africa) have not been able to obtain sufficient 
technological and financial assistance for the development of their national energy 
endowments raises a number of questions about the adequacy of present policies of financial 
assistance in the energy sector of these countries . We are led to question policies providing 
funds for much-needed oil imports but not sufficient means to substitute these by abundant 
national gas reserves . Therefore , in order that the apparent geological resource potential 
be realised, appropriate mechanisms will have to be rigorously developed for technical 
assistance, and especially for financing hydrocarbon (in particular natural gas) exploration 
and for the development of the associated infrastructure for its efficient use in developing 
countries even under low energy prices. 
Important market potentials for increased use of natural gas reserves also exist in 
developing countries: in the industrial sector (e.g . for fertilizer production), in the household 
sector (bottled natural gas liquids), and even in the transport sector (e.g. compressed natural 
gas cylinders, a technology already developed and used on a large scale , for instance in 
Italy since the 1950s) . However , the largest potential for natural gas may be in the 
decentralized production of electricity based on gas turbines. From the end-use side, gas-
turbine technology offers particularly promising prospects in view of the criteria of 
flexibility , environmental compatibility and energy efficiency . Manufacturers ' guaranteed 
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Table 3 Net oil importing developing countries with significant gas reserves 1 in 1987 . 
Source: CEDIGAZ [58] and UN Energy Statistics [59] 
Proved Production2 Energy consumption3 Ratio gas reserves to 
reserves2 1987 Commercial Total energy consumption 
EJ EJ EJ Commercial Total 
Africa 
Ivory Coast 3.8 0 0.072 0 . 153 52.8 24.8 
Mozambique 2.5 0 0 .051 0.192 48.4 12.9 
Rwanda 1.9 0 0.009 0.060 211. l 31.7 
Sudan 3.2 0 0.051 0.235 62.7 13.6 
Tanzania 4.5 0 0 .032 0.465 140.1 9.6 
South America 
Brazil 4.0 0.111 4.246 6.789 0.9 0.6 
Chile 4.6 0.028 0.404 0.463 11.3 9.8 
Columbia 4.4 0.156 0.869 1.046 5.0 4.2 
Asia 
Afghanistan 2.3 0.106 0 .057 0.105 40.7 22.1 
Bangladesh 13.7 0.141 0 . 175 0.435 78.2 31.4 
India 38.2 0 .319 6. 182 8.532 6.2 4.5 
Pakistan 23.8 0.452 0.868 1.095 27.4 21.7 
Papua New Guinea 3 .3 0 0.036 0.091 90.8 35.9 
Thailand 7.0 0 . 167 0.658 1. 138 10.6 6.1 
Yemen, North 4.0 0 0.038 n.a. 105.0 n.a. 
Note I: Countries with gas reserves greater than 50 x 109 m3 
Note 2: Average conversion rate used: 109 m3 natural gas equals 38 x 10 15 J or 0.038 EJ 
Note 3: n.a. = not available 
Table 4 Non-OPEC, non-oil-importing developing countries with significant gas reserves 1 in 
1987. Source: CEDIGAZ [58] and UN Energy Statistics [59] 
--
Proved Production2 Energy consumption Ratio gas reserves to 
reserves2 1987 Commercial Total energy consumption 
EJ EJ EJ Commercial Total 
Africa 
Angola 2. 1 0 0 .044 0 . 120 46.6 17.1 
Cameroon 4.2 0 0 . 149 0.229 28. 1 18.3 
Congo 2.6 0 0.007 0 .023 374.0 113.9 
Egypt 12.4 0.239 0.998 1.037 12.4 11.9 
South America 
Argentina 28 .8 0.585 1.750 1.860 16.0 15 .5 
Bolivia 5.4 0.106 0 .066 0.082 81.8 65.9 
Ecuador 4.3 0.002 0.204 0 .269 21.2 16.1 
Peru 12.9 0.049 0.421 0.502 30.7 25.7 
Asia 
Burma 10.2 0.046 0 . 103 0 .274 98.9 37 .2 
China 34.2 0 .787 21.893 23.667 1.6 1.4 
Malaysia 56.5 0.589 0 .748 0 .825 75.5 68 .5 
Note I: Countries with gas reserves greater than 50 x 109 m3 
Note 2: Average conversion rate used: 109 m3 natural gas equals 38 x 1015 J or 0.038 EJ 
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efficiencies above 50% are presently being realised (compared to about 32 to 34% for 
coal, oil or nuclear power plants) and 60% appears technically feasible . Flat economies 
of scale and low initial investments give this technology a particular advantage for flexible, 
modular and decentralized applications for electricity generation, e.g . in island operation 
mode (thus reducing the high capital requirements of electricity transmission and distribution 
networks associated with large-scale, investment-intensive hydropower projects) . Bottled 
natural gas liquids or similar commercial high-density energy carriers offer considerable 
energy efficiency advantages (up to a factor 8 [22]) over traditional renewable fuels for 
cooking purposes and could help to reduce local wood fuel shortages. 
Increased reliance on domestic natural gas resources could reduce the dependence 
on oil imports and reserve oil products for premium market segments (in particular the 
transport sector) . The use of high-efficiency gas turbines is in addition not confined to 
the availability of natural gas , as equally biomass (e .g. sugar cane residues , corn stover 
or rice husks) can be used as fuel. Williams and Larson [23] estimate for instance that 
the gas-turbine capacity which could be supported by biomass globally exceeds 100,000 
MW(e), most of it in developing countries . 
To summarize, the considerable economic and environmental advantages of natural 
gas (practically sulphur free, lowest nitrogen oxides and carbon dioxide emissions of all 
fossil fuels [24]) can only be realised in developing countries when appropriate instruments 
for technology transfer and financing of exploration activities and development of the 
necessary transport and distribution infrastructure are developed . In many developing 
countries this will also have to be supported by appropriate adjustments to the institutional 
and legal framework. Without such instruments the incentives for large multinational oil 
companies for natural gas exploration outside petroliferous provinces will - especially 
under continuing low energy prices - most likely not be sufficient to open the natural 
gas option for developing countries outside the already large number of countries in which 
significant gas reserves have been identified to date (see Tables 3 and 4) or to ensure that 
appropriate technical assistance and sufficient capital are made available for developing 
a natural gas supply and usage infrastructure in these countries . 
4 Manufacturing 
Mass production and mass consumption of energy- and material-intensive products have 
been at the core of the fourth Kondratiev upswing, particularly since the Second World 
War. Following this particular mode of economic growth, conventional wisdom holds that 
economies of scale and cost reductions via labour-saving technologies will consitute the 
major future driving forces in the manufacturing sector. We argue, however, that the 
emerging future development trajectory will be characterized by a shift in the value-
generating activities away from energy- and material-inte11sive products towards value-
and information-intensive ones . 
At the same time, the social and institutional dimension could possibly start to outweigh 
the proper technological one in the innovations paving the way to a new economic upswing . 
Reducing barriers to innovation, increasing flexibility, complexity and quality of the outputs 
of the economic system as well as the reduction of the time required between design and 
marketing, are possible more dependent on socio-institutional factors than on the availability 
of technological innovations alone. At the same time a host of technological innovations 
are at the brink of widespread diffusion into the manufacturing sector, all of which will 
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contribute to shape the structure and the determinants of future evolution of the 
manufacturing sector in the direction of material-extensive, value- and information-intensive 
products, the production of which will be progressively shaped by the whole philosophy 
of just-in-time production, rapid tum-around times and inventory minimization. 
One of the key technological factors in the future evolution of the manufacturing system 
has already emerged: low-cost micro-electronics. These developments enable flexible batch 
production networks, where all activities (managerial, administrative, productive, etc .) 
are integrated in an information-intensive system. Such production systems could 
progressively gain importance over the traditional continuous or production-line based 
mass-production system with its traditional segregation of managerial and production 
functions. The concept of integration will also shift from vertical (i .e. a company is engaged 
in all stages, from primary raw material production up to final product manufacturing 
and marketing) to horizontal integration, i.e. an increasing specialization, cooperation and 
eventually emergence of large specialized international companies performing specific tasks, 
such as design, marketing or financing, as discussed for instance by Pry [25]. 
The elements of this possible new development phase, which is often referred to as 
the ' information and communication' Kondratiev, are in the areas of micro-electronics 
and photonics technologies, enabling a quantum leap in performance and potential 
productivity increases [26], the emergence of material and energy efficiency improving 
technologies (examples include gas turbines, electronic applications in automobiles leading 
to reduction of specific fuel consumption, recent advances in aircraft propulsion, like ultra-
high-bypass engine designs, offering a 40% improvement in fuel efficiency, electric arc 
steel, etc .) as well as technologies enabling fast, flexible and extremely high-quality 
production of even small batch sizes: industrial robots , flexible manufacturing (FMS) and 
computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) systems . These technological developments are 
supported by developments in the application of micro-electronics and information 
technologies in the area of transportation of goods and the overall logistics chain which 
enable the realisation of 'just-in-time' production principles and the general minimization 
of inventory requirements . Last but not least , new organizational and institutional 
mechanisms are important prerequisites in order that the potential of these technologies 
may become translated into increased productivity and quality of production . These include 
new types of horizontal integration and specialization of service activities, which were 
previously performed within the manufacturing sector, such as CAD/CAM design , 
marketing, advertising, financing etc ., new forms of quality assurance and management 
methods and finally increasing flexibility in work time organizational patterns (which are 
however presently only just starting to emerge) . Another possibility appearing in the 
manufacturing sector as a result of the introduction of flexible manufacturing systems and 
of a pervasive diffusion of 'just-in-time' philosophy may be that in future not only 
manufactured goods but also manufacturing capacity trading (e.g. through futures contracts) 
may become important [27]. 
Of course , our discussion of the elements of a new development phase in the 
industry/manufacturing sector can only be indicative and illustrative. An excellent overview 
on technological issues, in particular on their globalization and effects on international 
competitiveness, is contained in a series of reports issued by the US National Academy 
of Engineering, in particular those by the US NAE [28], Guile and Brooks [29], and 
Muroyama and Stever [30] . In the following we would like just to provide a few illustrative 
examples of the technological and institutional/organizational characteristics of the fifth 
Kondratiev . Figure 2 illustrates the time pattern in the penetration of industrial robots 
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Figure 2 Industrial robot population trends in selected countries , in installed robots 
per 1000 employed in industry (logarithmic scale). Source: Tani [31] 
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(measured by the logarithm of the industrial robot density , i.e . robots per 1000 employed 
in industry) based on the work of Tani at IIASA [31] . Noteworthy is the similarity in 
slope of the diffusion curves, with only Japan having a lead of around 7 years over other 
industrialized countries. The dynamics of the introduction of these systems appear thus 
rather harmonized in different industrialized countries. As other studies at IIASA have 
shown (e.g . Tchijov and Sheinin [32] on the driving forces of the introduction of FMS 
and CIM systems) the main driving force for the introduction of such advanced 
manufacturing systems is not so much labour reduction but increasing the quality and speed 
of production, and in particular reducing inventories. 
The whole philosophy of just-in-time production and inventory minimization is probably 
best illustrated by the case of the Cadillac Allante , a car body manufactured by Pininfarina 
in Turin, Italy and transported by air over 5000 km to Detroit for final assembly of engine, 
powertrain and electronics by General Motors. This ' production line ' stretching over 
5000 km is apparently economic considering all the direct and indirect costs of potential 
damage risks, insurance and the production inventories that would be locked in ocean 
freighters for weeks . From such a perspective, further dematerialization (i.e. increasing 
the value generated per kilogram of material input) of manufactured goods and increase 
in their value through higher software [33] and information content (Figure 3), would 
tend to increase further the importance of air freight transport. The close relationship 
between new flexible, inventory-minimizing manufacturing systems and access to high-
quality transportation systems will be taken up again in the next section on possible future 
characteristics of transport and communication systems. Before we turn to this point let 
us address likely future tendencies in the manufacturing sector with some reference to 
newly industrialized (NICs) and developing countries. 
A first possible consequence of the tendencies emerging in the manufacturing sector 
of relevance to NICs and developing countries may consist in the relocation of certain 
manufacturing activities (say in the textile sector) back to highly developed countries . 
Labour cost advantages would under such tendencies no longer be a decisive locational 
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Figure 3 Software as fraction of total capital investments in the USA. Source: 
Ayres [64] 
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advantage if indeed quality, flexibility, small batch sizes, inventory and time reduction 
between design and marketing become the main driving forces in the manufacturing sector. 
In order to maintain a locational advantage it appears necessary to provide access to 
advanced communication and transport infrastructures (e.g. location of production facilities 
for export of manufactured goods close to airports) as well as to develop a new institutional 
and organizational framework, if the above-discussed characteristics of the manufacturing 
sector become indeed pre-eminent. On the other hand, NICs and developing countries 
may here have also a definitive strategic advantage, as they have no similar heavy 
commitment and full adoption of the traditional style of the manufacturing system and 
the socio-institutional framework supporting it. Taking advantage of the opportunities 
opened by an emerging new development phase, and introducing an institutional framework 
supporting it, may thus turn out to be easier than in the USA , with its heavy commitment 
to large-scale Fordist mass production based on Tayloristic management principles, or 
in Europe with its rigidities of the labour market. 
As a final note with respect to the manufacturing sector let us consider also the basic 
industries like steel production. We have argued above on the increasing tendencies towards 
'dematerialization' in terms of material consumption per unit of economic activity of 
developed economies. These tendencies have been impressively documented in the studies 
of the Princeton group, e.g . by Williams, Larson and Ross [34] and are illustrated in Figure 
4 for the case of the USA. This 'dematerialization' observed for advanced economies is 
the result of both changes in the output mix of these economies (shift to higher-value and 
information-intensive products, in particular the growth of the service sector) and in the 
availability of new materials (plastics, special alloys, composites, ceramics, etc.) enabling 
the same (even an improved) level of service (e.g. tensile strength) to be provided using 
less material input (measured by weight). 
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Figure 4 Materials consumption (in kg) over GNP (in 1983 US$) in the USA. 
Source: Williams et al. [34] 
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The increasing material input to the economy thus appears to be the result of a particular 
historical development phase, which presently appears already beyond maturity and being 
progressively replaced by a new regime. The correlation of material intensity with the 
level of economic activity, as illustrated in Figure 5 for Japan, the country which has caught 
up most spectacularly in this kind of development trajectory, has often led to a (prescriptive) 
extrapolation of this development strategy for other countries. It has been argued that, 
in order to achieve similar economic growth, follower countries would equally move up 
the material-GNP intensity curve, which was established on the basis of the historical 
experience of industrialized countries. This type of approach is for instance well visible 
in older forecasts on the level of world steel production. Reality has constantly fallen 
significantly short of such forecasts, as the global steel production has since the 1970s 
been characterized by a saturating market and output figures have fallen in the 700-800 
million tons per year range, compared to forecasts of well above the level of one billion tons. 
We argue that the saturation in the global steel output is a good indicator that: (a) 
developed countries move progressively in the direction of increasing dematerialization, 
and (b) that follower countries, whilst increasing their steel output, are not likely to do 
it in a (quantitatively) comparable way to that of the industrialized countries in the post 
Second World War period, because the particular development trajectory (high growth 
in steel-intensive sectors/products like automobiles, shipbuilding, etc .) characteristic of 
the economic growth of the fourth Kondratiev is not likely to be repeated. Here we do 
not imply that the basic material sector will not continue to be important for economic 
development, rather we argue that a comparable growth (i.e. an increase globally by a 
factor of 7 since the Second World War) to that of the previous phase of economic growth 
will not take place, as the particular historic development pattern based on massive diffusion 
of car ownership, consumer durables, etc. is progressively giving way to a new, emerging 
material- and energy-extensive growth trajectory. 
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Figure S Steel production intensity (kg per million 1980 Yen) versus GNP (in 10 12 
1980 Yen) in Japan 1930-1985. Source: Grilbler [35] 
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Even under a saturation (or only modest growth rates) of the basic material production, 
the much stronger dematerialization tendencies of developed countries will result in a further 
shift in the relative market shares (and most likely also of absolute production capacities) 
of the location of basic materials production. However, this is historically not a unique 
event. As Figure 6 illustrates, the world market dominance in the location of steel production 
has experienced in the past similar in-depth relocation phenomena. The UK had lost its 
market dominance to other European countries by 1870; UK and Europe lost dominance 
to the emerging USA, which became the largest world steel producer by the 1930s (end 
of the third Kondratiev), in tum losing out after the Second World War to newly emerging 
centres of steel production: the USSR, Japan and later NICs. If these historical tendencies 
continue to unfold as in the past, the share of NI Cs and developing countries in the world 
steel production will increase significantly at the expense of all other producers, including 
Japan. Scenarios developed at IIASA indicate that this share will increase to over 30% 
by the year 2000 and could approach 50 % after 2010 [35]. At the same time this production 
will progressively shift from large-scale integrated steel mills to more flexible and higher-
quality (including environmental) production, e.g. based on 'mini-mills' with recycled 
scrap and electric arc furnaces, continuous casting and a shift in production to high-quality 
speciality products. 
5 Transport and communication 
We consider two main trends emerging in the area of transport and communication. The 
first consists of a host of new technologies, allowing unprecedented levels of speed, variety 
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Figure 6 Share of different countries (regions) in world crude steel p1oduction. 
Source: Griibler [35) 
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and information density in communication. The second relates to the above-discussed future 
characteristics in the manufacturing sector (integration, small-batch production, increased 
flexibility and reduction of design to marketing lead times) and their resulting repercussions 
on the transport sector. Here in particular high-speed, high-quality transport systems (such 
as air transport) and nodes in the international transport network, which provide for the 
best integration of the various hierarchical levels (global/international, regional, national 
and local) and equally between different modes of the transport system, will be favoured. 
From a traditional viewpoint, the future of transport systems will be shaped by 
increasing economies of scale (e.g. larger, centralized warehouses) as well as by rapid 
structural change (e.g. a drastic short-term 'renaissance' of the European railways via 
upgrading of the existing infrastructure) . We anticipate, however, that the future of transport 
and distribution systems will be shaped more by the quest to enhance speed and flexibility 
and thus in the reduction of inventory requirements following a just-in-time philosophy 
as well as by the emergence of new forms of organization and management. For example, 
transport and warehousing functions will be transferred from manufacturing companies 
to specialized service enterprises. Organizational and management issues will without doubt 
be central elements shaping the comparative competitive advantage of different transport 
modes in the future. The latter may well turn out to be of greater importance than 
investments in upgrading existing infrastructures. At the same time the possibility should 
also be considered of the emergence of new infrastructures (e.g. Maglev trains in large 
urban corridors along the lines of the Japanese Shinkansen, or in connecting large air 
transport hubs). The development of new infrastructure systems, and especially their 
complementarity and integration into existing transport infrastructures, may be considered 
as an important area of strategic public infrastructure policy in the longer term, as opposed 
to the more short-term tactical concerns of present policy , trying to deal with bottlenecks 
(congestion) or negative externalities (i.e . environmental pollution) associated with intense 
road traffic in urban areas and international transit corridors. 
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Figure 7 Ton- and passenger-km per constant GDP (in 1913 Franc) in France 
1800-1987. Source : Griibler (13] 
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These driving forces shaping the future of the transport system, i.e. quality, including 
speed and environmental compatibility, flexibility and the application of 'just-in-time' 
principles to the area of transportation, and even to the whole logistics chain (i.e. including 
warehousing operations), enabled by the introduction of new information and 
communication technologies, will become ever more pervasive in the transition to higher 
shares of high-value goods ('dematerialization', i.e. decrease in energy- and material-
intensity and increase in information and software content per unit value) in the 
manufacturing sector discussed above. 
The apparent 'dematerialization' tendencies of advanced economies as reflected in 
indicators of material consumption per unit of economic activity (Figure 4 above) are also 
mirrored in indicators of transport intensity, as illustrated in Figure 7 in the case of France. 
The long-term perspective adopted in Figure 7 allows one to draw some conclusions with 
respect to likely future evolutions of transport intensities of advanced economies. As regards 
goods transport, industrialized countries appear to be at the brink of a major turning-point 
with respect to the material- and transport-intensiveness of their economies. Particularly 
since the early 1970s, the goods transport intensities started to decline [36], however, it 
is also noteworthy that similar tendencies are not observed with respect to passenger 
transport. This points to the complementary character of the growth in passenger transport 
and communications systems, discussed below. 
The reason for the apparent 'decoupling' of goods tonnage transported per unit of 
economic activity in industrialized countries is obvious. It stems from the gradual transition 
in the output mix of these economies in the direction of information- and value-intensive, 
but material-extensive, products and the availability of higher-quality and lighter substitutes 
in the form of advanced materials. This transition also has important repercussions on 
the type and quality of transport services required for the delivery of high-value goods , 
favouring transport modes with higher quality with respect to flexibility (i.e. smaller 
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Figure 8 Share of different transport modes in the value of imported manufactured 
goods versus value density of products (in OM per kg , logarithmic scale) in the FRG 
in 1986. Source : Griibler (13) 
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shipment sizes) and speed and reliability in delivery (such as truck and especially air 
transportation). This is illustrated in Figure 8, where the share of different transport modes 
in the imported value of manufactured goods as a function of the value density is reported 
for the FRG in 1986. Figure 8 illustrates that the most valuable goods are transported 
by more efficient and faster means of transport . Basic materials such as coal, gravel, scrap 
and raw materials in the value range of a few DM per kilogram are mostly transported 
by sea, canal and rail. As the value of the pr::iducts increases , trucks become more 
competitive and constitute the dominant transport mode in the value range up to 100 DM/kg. 
Most manufactured goods such as automobiles or machine tools fall below this threshold . 
Going to even higher value densities, i.e. goods with values exceeding 100 DM/kg , such 
as electronics, computers or precision instruments, one can see that they are usually shipped 
by air. Incidentally, the highest-value manufactured goods (excluding precious metals, 
drugs or caviar) are aerospace products and aircraft themselves, all exclusively transported 
by air. We have discussed above that, with the growing importance of just-in-time 
production regimes, the importance of air transport may increase even in the lower value 
density product categories and have illustrated this emerging tendency with the example 
of the air lift between Turin, Italy and Chicago in the fabrication of the Cadillac Allante 
car body . The increasing importance of air transport for freight will most likely result 
in further co-location of production facilities and services close to airports , in much the 
same way as industrial activities condensed along previous transport infrastructures: canals 
first , followed by railways, and later roads and highways . Access to infrastructure and 
interconnection to international trading flows of high value density products are , under 
the above-discussed tendencies , equally important for newly industrialized and developing 
countries in order to maintain locational advantages in the manufacturing sector. 
As we have discussed above , new communication systems are likely to be among 
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the most pervasive systems emerging in the fifth Kondratiev. In this context, it has frequently 
been argued that future developments in communication technologies will result in 
significant displacement effects of passenger travel. Whereas certain effects of new 
information and communication technologies, e.g. on business travel requirements, are 
likely to occur, there appears to be compelling historical evidence that transport and 
communication systems have evolved in unison (although over historical time periods not 
always at exactly the same rate) pointing to the complementary, even synergistic, 
relationship between passenger transport and communication. Figure 9 illustrates this 
historical relationship in the case of France, where the volume of passenger travel operations 
(i.e. sum of all passenger-km) is compared to the total output of the communication sector 
(i.e. sum of all messages transmitted in the form of letters, telephone calls, telexes, etc.), 
with 1985 being normalized as index 100. From such a long-term perspective, the 
relationship between transport and communication results in the case of France on average 
in 6 passenger-km travelled per message transmitted. Only in periods of particularly fast 
growth of new transport systems, like the railway growth in the second half of the 19th 
century or the growth of the automobile after the Second World War, does this ratio of 
transport intensities per message transmitted increa.>e. From such a perspective, the future 
growth of new communication systems may just b: enough to catch up with the intensive 
growth of passenger transport since the war and to re-establish a balanced growth path 
between passenger transportation and communication demand. 
To sum up the above discussion on emerging trends in the area of transport and 
communication, we have concluded that a considerable growth potential exists for further 
expansion of passenger travel and also for high-quality and high-speed (i.e. air transport) 
services in transporting (high-value) goods, whereas the transport intensity of bulk, low-
value goods appears to be declining in advanced economies. Finally, considering the strong 
growth dynamics in the Asian-Pacific region, the possibility of an emergence of a new 
'gravity centre' in transport (goods and people exchange) in this area also appears likely. 
Especially in view of likely developments in the manufacturing sector and the potential 
pervasive diffusion of new communication and information technologies, the questions 
of integration and access to the appropriate infrastructures will be of crucial importance 
for newly industrializing and developing countries. Equally important appears the integration 
and the complementarity of the various hierarchical levels of transport and communication 
infrastructures (e .g. connection of regional to international airports, emergence of new 
hubs, etc.) . From a development perspective, the emergence of new infrastructures would 
in principle also allow the possibility to jump one step in the development chain of transport 
and communication systems - for instance, communication networks based on Integrated 
Services Digital Networks (ISDN) or the development of high-capacity regional air transport 
systems rather than a development along the lines of post-war mass motorization and 
highway construction, as experienced in developed economies. The technological base 
for such developments can also be established in developing countries, as illustrated for 
instance in the recent project of cooperation between MBB, Germany and China on the 
development of a medium-sized (100 passengers) regional aircraft, to be produced in China. 
The successful Brazillian aircraft industry, producing small commuter aircraft may serve 
here as another illustrative example that the technological base is already partially developed 
and does not necessarily rely on a complete importation of the required technology. 
In the longer term, we anticipate the possible emergence of new ground-based, high-
speed, energy-efficient mass transit systems (e.g . based on superconductivity) both at the 
regional level (e .g . Maglevs) and for local traffic. The further development of urban high-
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Figure 9 Index (1985 = 100) of transport (total passenger-km) and communication (total 
number of messages transmitted) output of France 1810-1987. Source: Griibler [ 13] 
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capacity transit systems (e.g. Metros) in developing countries appears as the only feasible 
alternative in response to high growth rates of urban areas and the environmental pollution 
stemming from intense automobile traffic in metropolitan areas (as for instance the case 
of Mexico City and many other rapidly growing urban areas in the Third World). 
6 Diffusion bandwagons and development trajectories 
After addressing some tentative propositions regarding the possible form of the future 
trajectory of development as a result of the diffusion of a whole new set of technological 
and institutional innovations, which we have termed the 'information and communication 
Kondratiev', we would like to discuss three characteristics of the diffusion of pervasive 
socio-technical systems, derived from a historical analysis: (1) the inter-relatedness of 
a cluster or set of technological and institutional innovations, explaining their pervasive 
effects throughout the economy; (2) the international nature of the diffusion of such 
innovation clusters, in terms that a set of core countries display an inter-related dynamic 
in the development (growth) of such innovation clusters, with late-comers catching up. 
This development frequently results in a relatively synchronous pattern in the completion 
dates of the expansion of particular innovation clusters. The coupled diffusion dynamics 
between core countries stem from their integration in terms of exchanges in technologies, 
capital and human resources. Finally, (3) we observe heterogeneity (i.e. explicit differences) 
in the ultimate diffusion (i.e. density or consumption) levels achieved in different countries 
taking part in the realisation of a particular development phase. 
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6.1 Inter-relatedness 
The inter-relatedness of a whole host of technological and institutional innovations becomes 
readily apparent when the growth of very large pervasive infrastructures is analysed in 
detail. For instance, the development of the railways as the dominant transport mode of 
the second and third Kondratievs was contingent on a whole host of technological 
innovations, spanning the development of the steam engine (e .g. improving traction power), 
developments in material science to avoid (initially frequent) explosions of the steam boiler, 
developments in steel technologies for fabrication of steel rails, in communication 
technologies for signalling purposes (the telegraph), fuel technologies and improvements 
in energy efficiency [37], chemical industry (e.g. pesticides for treatment of wooden railway 
ties [38]), engineering and construction disciplines (e.g. construction of bridges, first trans-
Alpine crossings and tunnels like the Semmering crossing or the Simplon tunnel), etc. 
The above list could be supplemented by hundreds of further cases, but already the few 
illustrative examples provided serve as an indicator of the importance (and the 
interdependence) of a whole set or 'cluster' of technological innovations, which are required 
in order to develop such pervasive systems as new infrastructures. In addition, 
organizational and financial innovations were also of vital importance for the construction 
and operational management of railways, not only in the industrializing core countries 
but equally in the periphery [39]. 
Because of the inter-relatedness of innovations, new infrastructure systems are in fact 
a good macro-indicator for particular historical expansion periods, like the eras of canals, 
railways or the automobile (road). The pervasive effects on economic development of the 
development of such large systems do not stem only from a variety of multiplier effects 
(in terms of forward and backward linkages to other sectors of the economy), but especially 
from the fact that new infrastructure systems allow ever higher quality of service to be 
achieved, thus raising the productivity of economies to levels which would not have been 
possible by a simple intensification of use of old infrastructures. (Recall here the lines 
of Schumpeter in the introduction to this paper.) Thus, the development of railways for 
instance has to be considered as a fundamental quality leap in the productivity level of 
economies, which would have been impossible to achieve by a further development of 
stagecoaches and inland navigation systems. The pervasive effects of new infrastructures 
are not simply a contention, which we raise in this paper in order to use the diffusion 
of railways as an illustrative example, but the importance and pervasiveness of 
infrastructures are equally recognized by economic historians. In fact infrastructures are 
considered so important that their growth has been studied under the leading sector 
hypothesis [40] and their impact has been assessed in calculating the 'social savings', i.e. 
the costs incurred by an economy of not having a particular infrastructure [ 41] . We conclude 
thus that the inter-relatedness of a set of innovations, which make the diffusion of large 
complex infrastructures at all possible, and their resulting forward and backward linkages 
to the rest of the economy, explain their pervasive character and justify their use as indicator 
systems for particular historical economic expansion periods. In the following examples 
we will consider the case of the development of the railways as the most pervasive 
infrastructure system of the 19th century to illustrate the characteristics of the diffusion 
of such large-scale systems. 
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6. 2 Diffusion bandwagons 
In order to illustrate with an historical example the particular trajectory and development 
pattern of the expansion of economies in a particular development phase. as represented 
by its principal transport infrastructure, we consider below the growth of the railway 
network in a number of countries, measured in terms of the network size. The growth 
of the railway network of industrialized countries was a long process. In most cases it 
took around 100 years between the start of construction of the first line and the final 
completion of the network, which was achieved in basically all industrialized countries 
by the 1930s. Since then the length of the world's railway network has remained constant 
at around 1.3 million km, with however the network in industrialized countries contracting 
(due to the growth of successful competitors such as road and air transport). whereas in 
developing and industrializing countries the growth of the railways continued into the 1960s 
and in some countries (e .g. China, India or the USSR) even continues at present. 
The absolute network size developed was significantly different between countries. 
both in absolute as well as in relative (i .e. in density) terms. The USA once had the largest 
railway network of any individual country and the maximum network size was attained 
in 1929 with over 482,000 km. In the UK the maximum network size was attained in 
1928 with close to 33,000 km, and in France in 1933 with around 43,000 km. These figures 
already point to one interesting fact: the near simultaneous saturation in the expansion 
of the railway network in all industrialized countries by the early 1930s. In order to compare 
the dynamics of this expansion process, irrespective of the differences in the absolute 
network size (which is a result of the size of the country considered, its geography, the 
location of main industrial and urban centres, etc.) , we re-organize the data using a log it 
model, by which we approximate the empirical data on network expansion by calculating 
the parameters of the relevant growth processes described. The most important feature 
of the logit model [ 42] is that it allows us to consider each individual case within its own 
relevant boundary condition, i.e. the growth of the railways of a particular country is always 
compared in relation to the maximum network size (the saturation level of the growth 
process) attained in this country. Table 5 presents the results of an analysis of the expansion 
of the railway network of a number of industrial core countries, as well as the world total. 
It can be seen that the logit model performs reasonably well not only in estimating the 
ultimate saturation level of the expansion process of the railway network in these countries 
(maximum network size is systematically within less than 10 % deviation from the estimated 
value), but equally in the fit of the empirical data by the logit model (R 2 values well above 
0.99) [43]. The growth parameters a and b are denoted by t 0 (the time at which 50 3 
of the estimated final network length is achieved) and by £11 (the time in years required 
to grow from 10% to 90 3 of the ultimate saturation level). As shown in Table 5. the 
dynamics of the expansion of the railway network in all industrial core countries are within 
a very similar range ('1t of 47 to 57 years) . Only the late-comer Tsarist Russia is growing 
with a '1t of 37 years faster (catching up) than the other i11dustrial core countries. 
Figure 10 represents the expansion of the railway network of the countries of Table 
5 in the logit transform and exhibits clearly the coupled dynamics of the diffusion process 
in these countries, which proceeds in the form of an international diffusion bandwagon. 
As such it indicates the interconnection of the development trajectories in the expansion 
of the railway networks in these countries, an interconnection stemming from the integration 
of core industrial countries in terms of technology and capital exchanges. This statement 
does not only hold for the expansion of the railway network, but in a similar way applies 
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Table 5 Growth of railway networks (km). Source: Griibler (13] 
Estimated Maximum 1% of De11siry2 
sa1uration length to tH maximum Maximum Length in 1925 
Country leng1h (K) achieved leng1h length 
1000 km /000 km year years year year per JOO km 2 per I0,000 
inhabitants 
Austria-Hungary3 24.5 23.08 1883 51.8 1841 19138 8.0 10.2 
France 42.5 42.6 1876 47.l 1841 1933 9.7 13.7 
Germany4 66.8 63.48 1882 57.0 1841 19138 12.2 9.6 
Russia 73 .9 70.28 1890 37.4 1851 19138 0.3-1.5 4.8-8.4 
USSR 147.85 145.6 1949 43.6 1921 1986 0.75 5.55 
UK6 33.9 32.8 1858 56.6 1834 1928 16.0 8.8 
USA 526.1 482.7 1891 54.5 1840 1929 4.3 38.1 
World 1322.9 1255.07 1893 56.9 1844 1930 1.0 6.7 
Note I: Mitchell [60] 
Nole 2:Density as calculated by Woytinsky [61] for 1925 except Russia and USSR (own calculation). Range 
of figures for Russia corresponds to density for whole and European part territory respectively. Density figures 
for USSR are for 1986 network size. 
Note 3: Austria alone after 1919 
Note 4: Including Elsafi-Lothringen ; excluding E-L maximum network size was approximately 60 x 103 km by 
1938 
Note 5:Including intercept (73.9 x 103 km); 95% probability that K lies within 145.5-150.2 x 103 km. Density 
figures for 1986 network 
Note 6:Parameters refer to a Gompetz function (I 0 =Kle instead of K /2). 
Note 7: Mothes [621 
Note 8: Important territorial changes thereafter 
also to later basic transformations in the technology base of railways. To illustrate this, 
Figure 10 contains also the diffusion envelope of the substitution of (coal powered) steam 
traction by diesel and electric traction in the railway sector of a number of countries. It 
becomes apparent that the substitution of steam by diesel/electric locomotives proceeds 
with a similar dynamic (logistic) trajectory in all countries analysed, independent of their 
economic system - i.e. a diffusion bandwagon which can be observed for an important 
transformation of the technological base of a mature technological system, like the railways 
after the Second World War. 
A corollary of the diffusion bandwagon observation is that the particular viewpoint 
advanced here to describe historical development trajectories may serve in addition as an 
empirical measure to identify the countries, which by the nature of their different growth 
trajectory (i.e. expansion of their railway networks even after the 1930s), are apparently 
decoupled from the growth dynamics of the core countries participating in a particular 
economic expansion phase such as the railway era. The second expansion pulse of the 
USSR after 1930, as well as the continuing growth of railway networks in many developing 
countries (i.e. their different diffusion trajectories), may be interpreted as an indicator 
that these countries have not been integrated into the dynamics of economic growth and 
development of the industrial core countries driving the post-war expansion of the world 
economy. 
To summarize our findings stemming from an analysis of the international character 
of the growth of railway networks (as an infrastructure indicator of the second and third 
Kondratiev economic expansion periods), we state that the growth in a particular 
development phase proceeds in all core countries participating in such an expansion period 
by a similar dynamic, i.e. in the form of an international diffusion bandwagon. By 'similar 
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Figure 10 Growth pulses in the expansion of the railway network and in the 
replacement of steam locomotives, in fractional growth achieved of maximum 
network size and of total traction power. Note logit (log [F/1- F)]) scale . Source: 
Griibler [13] 
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dynamic' we do not want to imply that the growth rates are distributed uniformly between 
different countries, but rather that early starters exhibit a similar dynamic while late-comers 
showing a catch-up effect. The result is that the final realisation in the diffusion of a 
particular socio-technical system (in our case the steam/coal/railway development phase) 
becomes completed within a short time span in all countries participating in this particular 
phase of development [ 44). The example of the expansion of the railway networks points 
also to the critical importance of integration into technical knowledge , skills and capital 
flows for the successful participation in a particular expansion 'bandwagon'. This becomes 
in particular important for late-comers in the successful catching-up to the core countries . 
6. 3 Heterogeneity in diffusion levels 
We have concluded above that the expansion of the railway network was completed in 
all industrial core countries at latest by the end of the 1930s. Already in Table 5 we have 
illustrated the resulting densities, i.e. the length of railway lines per country area and per 
capita at the time when the expansion process was completed . Based on this historical 
example we may conclude that the diffusion of infrastructure networks and systems, whilst 
being comparable in terms of the dynamics (~t), resulted in different absolute as well 
as relative density levels. Different diffusion levels (densities) are the result of the diverse 
geographical, economic and social environments (boundary conditions) prevailing in 
different countries. Consider just the density levels presented in Table 5. The spatial railway 
densities range between 0 .7 (USSR, 1986) and 16.0 (UK, 1923) km railway lines per km2 
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territory, i.e. by a factor of more than 20. Per capita railway densities range from 5.5 
(1986, USSR) to 38 .1 (USA, 1923) km per 100,000 inhabitants, i.e . a factor of 
approximately 7. 
With respect to ultimate density levels achieved in a particular infrastructure 
development phase it is also interesting to extend our analysis to those countries that were 
not part of the 'railways bandwagon' of Table 5 and Figure 10. We have noted above 
that a number of developing countries continued railway construction after the saturation 
and contraction of railways in the industrialized core countries. Interestingly enough, 
construction in these countries occurred to the same extent as the railway network in 
industrialized countries contracted [ 45]. This implies that the growth of the railway network 
in any late follower country did not occur to the same extent as in the core countries 
participating in the 'railways bandwagon' . In analysing the diffusion level , i.e . the railway 
density per km2 country area [ 46] resulting from the growth of these to varying degrees 
' railway late-comers' , we observe an interesting fact: the diffusion levels appear to decrease 
the later a country started construction, as illustrated in Figure 11 . 
Two empirical measures are developed to assess the starting date for the construction 
of a national railway network. First, the year the network extended for the first time to 
over 1 % of its final maximum size, using either the historical dates indicated in Figure 
11 or in cases such as China where the network is still growing the latest year for which 
data were available . The second measure records the date the first railway line of national 
importance was constructed. 
Figure 11 suggests that the railway densities can be regrouped by a declining 'density 
envelope' as a function of the date railway construction began. The later a country started, 
the apparently proportionate fewer railway lines it constructed. The only exception is Japan, 
where construction started rather late (in the 1870s) but a network of a similar scale (density) 
as in the industrial core countries forming the ' railways bandwagon' was constructed. This 
Figure 11 Spatial railway density (km railways per 100 km2) envelope versus network 
construction date . Source: Griibler [13] 
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is possibly an indication that Japan was preparing as early as the second ha! f of the 19th 
century for its spectacular catching up in the 20th century by developing its infrastructural 
endowment (in addition to the educational system, science and technology policy, etc.) . 
As similar analysis [13] suggests, Figure 11 does not hold only for railways but also 
for the diffusion of more recent transport systems, in particular for the diffusion of car 
ownership. There also the diffusion levels of countries following later do not reach the 
levels of the first countries to start motorization. If a similar development pattern were 
to unfold as in the case of the railways, this would imply that a comparable (private car) 
motorization in countries of the second and third world as in industrialized countries should 
not be expected. 
Instead of developing along the technological and infrastructural lines of past economic 
expansion periods of industrialized countries, we consider that successful catching up will 
depend more on developing the technologies and infrastructures of the forthcoming 
development trajectory discussed in some detail above. Exaggeration sometimes serves 
to illustrate a particular argument: imagine the validity of a long-term economic growth 
or development scenario constructed around indicators of the length of canals and railways, 
the installed horsepower of steam engines or the specific energy consumption of Bessemer 
steel production (more than 10 times as high as at present) of industrialized countries around 
1870 and suggesting this as a target for the industrialization and catching-up of Japan in 
1930. 
Thus we draw two main conclusions with respect to the density levels resulting from 
the diffusion of large, pervasive infrastructure systems. Firstly, diffusion levels are different 
(heterogeneous) even within the core countries developing along a similar trajectory at 
various historical economic expansion periods, as a result of different boundary conditions 
prevailing in individual countries. Therefore it is absolutely pointless to infer from the 
diffusion level achieved in early starter countries (e.g. the UK for railways or th:.: USA 
for automob:les) to other countries. The railway network of the USA was highly developed 
(in fact the largest in the world) by 1930, yet its spatial density was only one-quarter that 
of the UK. No one could seriously suggest that the railway network in any of the countries 
presented in Table 5 was not sufficiently developed by 1930. Still, the diffusion levels 
(network density) were very heterogeneous even among the countries forming the ·railways 
bandwagon', and the fact that in the USA the ultimate automobile density may approach 
one vehicle per inhabitant after the year 2000 does not imply that such a level is a realistic 
(or desirable) forecast for Austria or France, where density levels below 0.5 cars per 
inhabitant appear to be typical for the ultimate saturation level l 13 J. 
Finally, we may also consider possible heterogeneity (diversity) i.n the technok;gical 
design and institutional embedding of infrastructures. Even if a similar functional structure, 
say in the transport sector, exists between different countries, this functional simi larity 
may be achieved by different technological and/or organizational settings . For instance, 
there exists a striking functional similarity in the long-distance passenger transport systems 
between the USA and the USSR. In both countries the dominant long-distance passenger 
transport mode is based on the internal combustion engine and road infrastructure; however 
in the case of the USA, transport is mainly by (private) individual road vehicles, whereas 
in the USSR it is via (collective) bus transport operations. On the other hand , the trend 
towards public air transport (measured in terms of the increasing market share of air 
transport in total long-distance passenger-km) is similar in both countries. 
The heterogeneity in diffusion levels and technological and institutional design and 
embedding options becomes even larger when considering countries which are not among 
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the core countries of a particular (infrastructure) development phase. Returning to our 
example of the railway network densities, we observe that China would have to increase 
its present railway network by a factor over 20 (!) in order to achieve a similar spatial 
railway density to that of the industrialized core countries in the 1930s. This does not 
only appear highly infeasible, it also would be simply absurd to suggest a repetition of 
a growth trajectory of a past development phase, which has already started to vanish and 
is of little importance for further economic growth in industrialized countries [47]. We 
contend that a similar statement also holds true for the massive diffusion of car ownership 
to levels anywhere near those presently achieved in industrial countries . 
If we observe heterogeneity in diffusion levels and design and institutional options 
within developed countries, we may conclude that such heterogeneity is even greater 
between developing countries themselves. In fact, it is argued by Nowotny [48] that 
heterogeneity and social divergences have become inherent structural characteristics of 
developing countries, which are often (inappropriately) subsumed under a common heading 
('the South', etc.). Thus, we suggest that traditional conceptualizations in terms of bipolar 
models (North - South) may indeed be over-simplifications, especially when considering 
the initial conditions and catching-up possibilities in a new development phase, which are 
and will be extremely heterogeneous between developing countries. This heterogeneity 
will especially have to be considered when developing criteria of sustainability of various 
development trajectories. Brooks [49] argues that such criteria will have to be defined 
over a spatially heterogeneous system, consisting of clusters of interacting spatially-related 
systems, which may not necessarily be in geographic proximity to each other. 
Thus, any scenario of future development and catching-up has to account for the 
different boundary conditions prevailing in different countries when assessing diffusion 
levels, and even technological choice options. As a result (desirable) diffusion levels (e.g. 
infrastructure endowments) cannot be defined through a normative framework , in inferring 
from the diffusion levels achieved in one country, to another one. Early starters may serve 
as a 'development model' only at very specific periods in time, i.e. when catching-up 
within a particular diffusion bandwagon characteristic of a given development phase, but 
not at later time periods . 
With particular reference to developing countries we argue that precisely the very 
nature of the transition to an emerging new development phase holds important implications 
for investment strategies and in particular for anticipated resource consumption levels. 
Under the hypothesis of such a transition all traditionally employed indicators to describe 
(appropriate) levels and trajectories of development (like the example of railway densities 
or car ownership rates discussed above) become progressively inadequate. This is also 
the reason why Malthusian resource limits resulting from the extrapolation of indicators, 
which were appropriate only under a previous growth regime (say per capita car ownership 
or oil consumption , steel intensity per unit of GNP, etc.), are in fact hypothetical, as they 
ignore fundamental historical experiences of economic development - the process of change 
and structural transition to new phases of development. Thus, the very concept of 
sustainability, especially when entailing economic development and technological change, 
has to be redefined as an evolutionary one. Brooks [49] argues that within the context 
of sustainable development the rate of change of the structure of demand (i.e. the transition 
to a new development phase) may be a more serious limiting factor than absolute levels 
of demand and resulting strains on the (exhaustible) resource base, because of the constant 
evolution of the latter through improvement in exploration (e.g. the significant increase 
of the resource potential of natural gas discussed above) , extraction , recycling and 
substitution technologies . 
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In summarizing the above discussion let us repeat briefly the main arguments of 
relevance for the formulation of possible trajectories for catching-up under a newly emerging 
development phase. Based on historical examples we have tried to illustrate the importance 
of integration into international flows of capital and technological knowledge in order to 
most effectively make use of the opportunities opened up by the diffusion of a new socio-
technological 'bandwagon' embodying a quantum leap in potential productivity of economies 
and opening up a wide range of growth opportunities. This holds important implications 
for the development of appropriate financial and technological resource transfers to 
developing countries, especially in the areas which we have identified as emerging as key 
technological elements of the information and communication Kondratiev. 
At the same time we have refuted the prescriptive character of some development 
scenarios in that we argue that heterogeneity both in the socio-technological options as 
well as in the ultimate intensity (diffusion) levels realised was, and will continue to be, 
one of the essential factors to be kept in mind when formulating scenarios and policies 
for the introduction and assessment of the growth potential of new technologies, particularly 
in developing countries. This heterogeneity in the technological (design) options and ultimate 
penetration levels stems from different geographic, social, etc. boundary conditions 
prevailing in different countries and from the fact that successful catching-up is more 
contingent on development of the technological elements and infrastructures of the new 
development regime than on repeating a trajectory of a past expansionary period. As such, 
heterogeneity in the ultimate realisation levels of a new socio-technic development phase 
and non-repetition of intensity levels of previous ones have important repercussions on 
our perception of future sustainability, which is often perceived as being threatened by 
scenarios assuming strong homogenization in development patterns, lifestyles and resource 
consumption levels. 
7 Two hidden agendas in the development process 
One of the major goals in analysing processes of technological innovation and diffusion 
is to gain a deeper understanding of the conditions for economic development and for 
effectively catching-up, especially urgent in view of the gap that remains and even becomes 
wider between highly industrialized, industrializing and developing countries. Most studies 
preoccupied with such analysis are based upon the central assumption of the crucial role 
that technological innovation and technology issues play in the process of develoµment, 
an assumption which seems warranted when looking at international trade and economic 
growth models. 
Yet, there is also a 'hidden agenda' beneath the purely technological issues. It touches , 
on the one hand, upon the much less tangible institutional preconditions and arrangements 
which accompany or precede effective economic and technological development. The 
second 'hidden agenda' deals in particular with the role of science and science policy in 
developing countries within the process of absorption and development of technology, 
as a further 'intangible' precondition for catching-up. 
Institutional preconditions for catching-up range from the obvious ones , like levels 
and spread of education or the diffusion of technical skills in a society, to very complex 
ones, which are intricately bound up with the historical development, its continuities and 
especially its discontinuities within a society. Rosenberg and Birdzell [50] have argued, 
for instance, that the West began its rise from an economic and technological position 
somewhat behind that of Chinese and Islamic civilizations of the same period. The authors 
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cite among the many factors contributing to the Western success story such institutional 
arrangements as the early separation of the political and economic spheres, or economic 
decentralization. Rosenberg and Birdzell distinguish between two patterns of economic 
growth: one associated with an expansion of trade and economic resources, and the second, 
primarily attributable to scientific and technological innovation, essentially starting with 
the 18th century. Innovation is interpreted in a wider sense; as such it includes 
experimentation (inventions and their further systematical development) within science, 
but also 'experimentation' within the economic sphere, with respect to new products , 
methods of manufacturing, modes of enterprises, organization of market relations, in the 
transport and communication systems, etc. 
As the history of science and technology in the West shows, scientific activity was 
for the most part not undertaken in response to economic needs, and for most of history 
in the West and elsewhere, science and industry might have existed in completely different 
worlds. However, it was the gradual linkage of innovative activities in such different spheres 
as the world of economic enterprises and that of science, a linkage achieved through 
institutional arrangements and mechanisms such as decentralization of a?1thority, scientific 
autonomy as well as the emergence of professionalization as a set of rules, attitudes and 
behaviour, by which science and technology became the key factors shaping and fuelling 
economic growth. Even if many of these and similar arguments can be disputed in details 
and warrant further evidence, it is nevertheless also clear that institutional configurations 
played a decisive role in "how the West grew rich" [50]. 
These institutional configurations are often taken for granted when looking at 
technological evolution alone, but we consider the institutional framework of the embedding 
of science and technology to be of decisive importance not only when considering the 
inception of innovations (i.e. inventions) and the capacity to absorb them into the economic 
and social spheres (in translating them into products, processes, forms of organization 
and so on), but especially also for the subsequent diffusion phase, as the latter entails a 
whole host of consecutive incremental innovations and adaptation (improvement) processes, 
without which no particular innovation (not to mention large, pervasive socio-technological 
systems) could diffuse (become absorbed) into the economic and social strata. 
The second agenda somewhat 'hidden' from traditional inquiries of technological 
processes and thei.r diffusion patterns, is science itself. It remains ecEpsed in much, if 
not practically ail, the literature on the effective conditions for economic and technological 
catching-up. Science seems also to be absent from policy documents: the Brandt report, 
to cite but one example, does not mention science even once. One of the reasons for such 
oversights might stem from the fact that analysts of technology transfer or diffusion 
processes are often oblivious of the work performed within ' science studies', just as those 
who work within the latter area are often not trained in the economic disciplines nor do 
they consult the relevant literature. 
Occasionally however, controversial statements about the relevance of research on 
science and technology in developing countries surface, which illustrate the wide range 
of different orientations, assumpticns, conceptual frameworks and policy priorities which 
exist in this particular area. On the one hand, there exists a more 'technology oriented' 
point of view, where the principal emphasis is on the (short-term) economic effects that 
the development of science and technology may have in developing countries. The argument 
presented goes along the lines, that one should mainly consider the short-term economic 
dimension of science and technology, which can bring relief to some of the present urgent 
needs which developing countries are confronted with. In addition, and this is the most 
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controversial argument, but one which follows logically from the primary emphasis in 
the short-term economic benefits resulting from science and technology, the role of science 
itself is up for discussion when compared to that of technology. When compared to the 
basic research performed in highly industrialized countries, the achievements coming from 
developing countries appear, with a few exceptions, irrelevant. Given the enormous gap 
that exists in resources, personnel, equipment and organization of research, indigenous 
scientific research in developing countries must become either a kind of 'bare-foot science ' 
or remains the dream of an unrealistic luxury, which developing countries cannot afford 
as long as other more pressing needs remain unmet. A second line of argument goes in 
the opposite direction, namely that without appropriate scientific skills and a more universal 
orientation, developing countries may never be in a position to effectively absorb technology 
and to develop the local modifications and add-ons, without which any technology transfer 
must remain limited in its capacity to contribute to the solution of the most urgent local 
problems. 
Thus divergent points of view exist, with one side arguing for a pragmatic short-term 
economic benefit oriented approach with emphasis on international technological (import) 
linkages, while the other side argues for a more universal orientation and emphasis also 
on indigenous scientific development, which might be an important strategy to enable 
developing countries to participate in what is, after all, a shared cultural heritage of 
humankind. These divergent viewpoints also reflect a dilemma that scientists in developing 
countries know only too well - a dilemma between a 'local' orientation, geared to practical, 
useful and relevant work, which however carries little prestige and rewards from the 
international scientific community, or of maintaining an international orientation and identity 
but becoming at the same time alienated from the national context (see, for instance Shenhav 
l51] on this point) . 
Such a dilemma, acutely felt on an individual as well as on a collective level, can 
be traced to the fact that science in developing countries (again with a few exceptions) 
"is but a marginal add-on to the knowledge flows that transform their social and economic 
life" (Hill [52]). Science is thus not connected with the user environment in the same way 
as is the case in industrialized countries. Therefore, independent of what are the pressing, 
immediate needs in different national contexts, the question remains, how in the long run 
can a social and economic context be generated which allows science to take root in 
developing countries, and appropriate preconditions be generated for the effective 
absorption, adaptation or indigenous developments of technologies, production methods, 
etc. all of which are mediated by science and upon which catching-up will be contingent. 
Someone who has used all his scientific authority and international standing to criticize 
both governments of developing and industrialized countries for failing to recognize the 
crucial importance of science for technological and economic development has been Abdus 
Salam (e.g. [53, 54]). The widening gap in living standards is, he maintains, principally 
a science and technology gap, which is due to the fact that expenditures on science and 
technology are orders of magnitude higher (both in absolute amounts, and also as percentage 
of GNP) in industrialized than in developing countries. Typically science and technology 
expenditures range between 2 to 2.5 % of GNP in the industrialized North compared to 
some 0.2 % in the developing South [55]. The corresponding figures for defence, education 
and health care however, do not show a similar order of magnitude of structural difference . 
They are 5 .6% (of GNP) for defence in both hemispheres , 5 .2%-3.8% for education 
and 4.8 %-1.5 % for health care in the North and the South respectively. Salam interprets 
these figures as a lack of commitment towards science in developing countries and as a 
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lack of self-reliance in the technology area, which results in an ever-widening science 
and technology gap with potentially staggering consequences. 
By neglecting the science base of technology, the science transfer which must always 
accompany technology transfer (if it is to mean more than simply the importing of designs, 
machinery, technical personnel or even commodities) is also neglected. "Very few within 
the developing world appear to stress that the science of today is the technology of tomorrow 
and that when we speak of science it must be broad based in order to be effective for 
applications" . It is thus important to be concerned about science transfer at least as much 
as about technology transfer. When speaking about science transfer one can consider four 
stages. First and foremost, scientific literacy and science teaching must be reached at all 
levels, including at least one complete science library as a minimum infrastructure in all 
developing countries. In a second stage, the indigenous scientific community of developing 
countries should be consulted on which technologies would be relevant and worth acquiring, 
since there is no substitute for motivated and competent local scientific advisers. Third, 
at least a limited number of developing countries should be able to address and to solve 
problems of agriculture, of local pests and diseases and how to most effectively make 
use of local resources and materials. Science should in this particular stage be primarily 
geared to address application-oriented problems within a local context, but in connection 
to the full body of scientific knowledge available internationally. Only then the fourth stage 
is set for basic research, being able to bear fruits in form of high technology, and for 
carrying out science-based research in view of specific applications. 
At present, there are several pilot projects under way, which attempt to realise precisely 
what the later stages of the science transfer model outlined above imply: putting to use 
science for local needs in agriculture, disease and pest control as well as helping to find 
new uses for local materials and resources. Such strategies are also needed for resources, 
but they could open up a road forward, one in which a conscious social choice could become 
available for the first time. In highly industrialized countries there constantly operates a 
process of selection, in which scientific discoveries (inventions) that show potential 
economic and social benefits become translated into innovations. A similar social choice 
mechanism could also possibly by implanted deliberately in those developing countries 
which have reached a higher stage of science transfer, but which are lacking a comparable 
set of economic forces and social (regulatory) frameworks operating as selection 
mechanisms in developed countries. 
Creating technological applications tailored to locally (abundantly) available materials 
and resources is but one example for a science-based technology policy, which does not 
follow blindly a path modelled after the experience (and specific requirements) of developed 
countries. Similar attempts with great potential are undertaken also in the area of 
biotechnology, which has a vast potential in radically transforming agriculture, energy 
and medicine in the longer-term and which could also open new avenues for social choices. 
At the same time a reconceptualization of the production process appears possible, allowing 
a radically different 'customer-tailored' type of production in line with meeting user demand 
specifications of unprecedented levels, in a similar way as we have discussed above for 
possible emerging new production principles in the manufacturing sector of highly 
developed countries. 
In order to take advantage of such new developments, it is apparent that science-based 
applied technological research in developing countries cannot proceed without new networks 
of cooperation. New networks are needed, both between research institutions within 
developing countries and also through new and stronger links to developed countries. 
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The question of the role of science in the development process and whether its role 
(what we have termed a 'hidden agenda') can be defined in unanimous agreement remains 
open. By its very nature there is no one-way, causal link between scientific capability 
or level of commitment and investments into science and economic growth and development. 
However, as the sketchy propositions outlined above tried to make clear, the role of science 
has to be seen as crucial in a larger cultural, social and institutional context which leads 
to a possibility for implanting indigenous social choices rather than responding to (i .e . 
importing) the technological choices stemming from market and social clearing processes 
in the developed world. Promotion of science, both in terms of committing funds as well 
as in fostering the growth of indigenous scientific communities, may indeed by an important, 
if not the important condition for full participation in a universally shared heritage which 
holds the keys for further relief of poverty and betterment of human conditions, as well 
as to the sustainable global development of natural resources. 
Investing more into science, even if the sums involved remain modest compared to 
spending levels of industrialized countries, may permit the further growth of an indigenous 
local community of scientists who are potentially important bearers and transmitters of 
knowledge which is part of international and national public knowledge. It also offers an 
opportunity for the growth of a relatively autonomous sphere within society, which is not 
under direct influence and control of governments and decision makers, and which is distinct 
in outlook, values and orientation from a trading or merchant class. The few developing 
countries which have succeeded in building up a respectable and sizeable scientific 
community - above all Argentina, Brazil, China and India - and whose performance 
in many fields compares with that of highly industrialized countries, are, perhaps not by 
chance, countries with a large population and a highly differentiated social structure. 
Moreover, they are countries with an old tradition of scientific creativity and 
accomplishments, or heirs to such a tradition. However, there is no reason to believe 
that commitment to science and scientific values is limited by the size of a country. 
Yet, as much as science may be esteemed in its own right or as a cultural reinforcement 
for self-reliance and participation of developing countries in the shared heritage at the 
global level, it will in addition be of crucial importance to link scientific discoveries to 
technological innovation so that they will yield material benefits as well as a higher problem-
solving capacity . Not only because of the crucial (and still far from being adequately 
understood) step from scientific inventions to technological innovations, but also because 
of the continuous further development and incremental improvements necessary in order 
for technological diffusion, opening the real economic dimension and impact of 
technological change becomes possible. 
This brings us back to the question raised initially about the conditions for catching-
up effectively by those who otherwise would remain trapped in the vicious circle of ' locked-
in' development, where the gap between the rich and the poor remains or even widens. 
Until more recently, quite a number of growth models assumed a somewhat automatic 
or semi-automatic mechanism at work (of 'take-off' or 'competitive exclusion'). Recently, 
attention has shifted to identify more closely and in detail those periods in which 'windows 
of opportunity' are open at least for a limited time period. Also here a distinction is made 
between the mere ' use' of technology already available at the world level and acquiring 
the capacity for participating in the generation and improvements of technologies opening 
the possibility to catch up. The latter, however, pre-supposes a command of sufficient 
scientific and technological knowledge for a real participation in a particular period and 
field of technological development . 
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What Pasteur said about the individual scientist, namely that the 'chance' of scientific 
discovery meets only those whose minds are prepared for it, holds true also for nations 
and their chances of utilizing windows of opportunity as long as they are open. Catching-
up would mean, under such a perspective, to be in a position to take advantage of the 
opportunities which are created by technological transitions or 'paradigm' changes, bearing 
in mind that such opportunity windows exist only temporarily. 
Perez and Soete [56] in particular have discussed in more detail the costs and the timing 
of entry in a process of technological evolution, once it has been set in motion. At the 
outset, there is every reason to believe that the vast majority of new technologies will 
originate primarily from the technologically most advanced countries. Perez and Soete 
consider in addition, that at least in some of the advanced economies the diffusion of major 
new technologies and systems will be hampered by heavy investment outlays already made 
in the past into more established technologies as well as by (slow) institutional and social 
adjustment processes to a new 'paradigm' of economic growth and development. 
Theoretically this could imply that a new technological trajectory might have better, 
unhampered starting and diffusion conditions in those countries which are less committed 
to an old technological regime in terms of actual production, investments, skill levels and 
organizational and institutional embeddings. This is, in a nutshell, one lesson to be learned 
from the historical experience of industrialization and technology diffusion in 19th century 
Europe and the USA [57]. Historical experience suggests that windows of opportunity 
exist for late-comers. It remains however less clear if the historical conditions that prevailed 
in the 19th century in a small part of the world are comparable to those prevailing today 
in a world that has become linked globally through the reverberating effects of techno-
economic innovation waves. 
Perez and Soete [56] consider that the requirements for entry in the first phase (i.e. 
the beginning) of the lifecycle of a new technological system are relatively low as regards 
experience or managerial ability and capital requirements (contrary to the import of capital-
intensive mature technologies), which would make them amenable for some developing 
countries. However, there are two additional requirements which also would have to be 
met: first, to overcome or to compensate for the lack of locational and infrastructural 
advantages, and second, to dispose of the scientific and technical knowledge necessary 
to make use of the opportunities opened. It is certainly true that much of the knowledge 
required to enter a new technology system in its early phase is public knowledge (available 
at universities for example). At the same time it is also apparent that many of the skills 
and incremental improvements necessary for the successful introduction and subsequent 
diffusion of a new technological system can only be acquired by a process of 'learning 
by doing' . Science policy in developing countries should under such a conjecture not only 
be concerned with the appropriation of (in principle free) public knowledge at the 
international level, but also of how this knowledge can effectively be translated to respond 
particularly to national and local requirements for new processes, products and services . 
Perez and Soete suggest that it is this 'time for learning' for everybody, which creates 
one of the favourable conditions for catching-up. The second one is created by offering 
low threshold costs for newcomers in terms of the appropriation of knowledge and its 
translation into technical skills, etc. In addition, newcomers do not face the high costs 
of getting rid of the capital vintages, experience and externalities of the 'wrong sort' of 
superseded technologies. In other words, opportunities accrue to those who are sufficiently 
prepared and who do not have to face the costs of obsolescence and decommissioning 
of older technological systems and infrastructures. 
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Thus, technological innovation processes could allow for breaking a vicious cycle, 
especially (possibly only) in the very early phase of the lifecycle of a newly emerging 
technological system, i.e. in the transition period to a new development phase in which 
the ultimate characteristics and trajectories of economic growth and catch-up opportunities 
are being formed. However, this puts an even greater premium on being prepared to 
perceive and seize the opportunities which thus arise: any developing country that can 
take advantage of this sort of opportunity must have developed a position (probably through 
decades of efforts in entering mature technologies) to deploy sufficient scientific capabilities, 
technical skills and supportive institutional frameworks in order to be ready for catching up. 
8 Conclusions 
By adopting a long-term Schumpeterian perspective on economic development we have 
tried to emphasize in particular the discontinuous manner in which technological , 
organizational and institutional innovations become absorbed into our economies and 
societies. From such a perspective we appear to be in the midst of a transition to a new 
phase of development, which will be quantitatively and qualitatively different in its final 
realisation in the form of new technologies, infrastructures , skill levels, institutional and 
organizational settings and in the dominant driving forces shaping the future structure of 
economies and the trajectories of their evolution . 
We have tentatively sketched some of the technological characteristics of the emerging 
new development phase of the fifth Kondratiev in the areas of energy (natural gas), 
transportation (air transportation) and manufacturing (micro-electronics). Generally we 
anticipate that the principal future driving forces will be more in the direction of enhancing 
qualitative characteristics in terms of efficiency , environmental quality and system 
integration shaped by the philosophy of 'just-in-time' production, than in a repetition of 
the quantitative growth trajectory of energy- and material-intensive products and processes 
characteristic of the post Second World War development phase . 
With reference to developing countries , we consider that successful catching-up will 
be more contingent on the development along the directions of the emerging fifth Kondratiev 
than on imitation of a growth trajectory of a past (and progressively vanishing) development 
phase. Under such a conjecture, concerns about future sustainability (as a result of a 
prescriptive extrapolation of development trajectories and resource consumption levels 
from the experience of industrialized countries) may have to be reconsidered. 
Windows of oppportunity for catching-up are opened in such a transition phase to 
a new mode of economic growth as the appropriation of scientific and technical knowledge 
is an easier task at the beginning of the lifecycle of a new technological system than in 
later phases. In addition, developing countries may even have a strategic advantage in 
such a transition phase to a new development mode as they have no comparable commitment 
in terms of infrastructures, capital vintages, skill levels and organizational and institutional 
settings to the previously dominant mode and trajectories of the evolution of the techno-
economic system. 
Successful catching up appears from such a perspective to depend primarily on the 
preparedness to anticipate and to develop along newly emerging directions rather than 
to follow a prescriptive development path of the progressively vanishing 'socio-technical 
paradigm ' of the past. It will also be contingent on other factors , including the development 
of appropriate locational and infrastructural endowments and the level of education and 
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skills. 
Finally, we would like to emphasize that whilst the technological dimension, as nexus 
and growth stimulating factor towards a fifth Kondratiev upswing, is certainly central, 
one has to consider equally the importance of the social and institutional embedding of 
technologies, as a key factor in the diffusion of large pervasive systems. The role of science 
and of scientific capabilities in the appropriation of technical knowledge and in the 
development of local skills and areas of applications of new technologies, as well as the 
role of an appropriate organizational and institutional environment in the development and 
diffusion of technological systems, will without doubt be decisive factors for success or 
failure in making best use of the opportunity windows opened in the transition towards 
a new phase of growth and prosperity. 
References and Notes 
1 Schumpeter, J .A. (1935) 'The analysis of economic change' Review of Economic Statistics Vol. 
17, pp . 2-10 
2 Schumpeter, J.A. (1939) Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis 
of the Capitalist Process Volumes I and II, McGraw-Hill, New York 
3 Kondratiev , N .D. (1926) 'Die langen Wellen in der Konjunktur' Archiv far Sozialwissenschaft 
und Sozialpolitik Vol. 56, pp. 573-609. [Note that German transliteration reads N.D. 
Kondratieff.] 
4 Freeman, C. (ed.) (1983) Long Waves in the World Economy Butterworths, London 
5 Freeman, C. and Perez, C. (1988) 'Structural crises of adjustment, business cycles and investment 
behaviour' in G. Dosi et al. (eds) Technical Change and Economic Theory Pinter Publishers, 
London and New York 
6 Mensch, G. (1975) Das technologische Patt, Innovationen uberwinden die Depression Umschau 
Verlag, Frankfurt 
7 Marchetti, C. (1985) 'Swings, cycles and the global economy' New Scientist No. 1454, pp. 
12-15 
8 Nakicenovic, N. (1984) Growth to limits, Long Waves and the Dynamics of Technology Doctoral 
dissenation, University of Vienna 
9 For a comprehensive overview of this line of research see van Duijn [65], Vasko [66], or 
Goldstein [67] 
10 Dosi, G. (1983) 'Technological paradigms and technological trajectories: the determinants and 
directions of technical change and the transformation of the economy', in C. Freeman (ed .) 
Long Waves in the World Economy Butterworths , London 
11 Perez, C. ( 1983) 'Structural change and the assimilation of new technologies in the economic 
and social system' Futures Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 357-375 
12 For empirical evidence of the acceleration of the diffusion of incremental innovations towards 
the 'Kondratiev barrier' see Griibler [13] 
13 Griibler, A. (1988) The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures: Dynamics of Evolution and Technological 
Change in Transpon Doctoral dissertation, Technical University of Vienna, and Physica Verlag, 
Heidelberg (forthcoming) 
14 For a discussion of ' lock-in ' effects, i.e. the mechanism by which initial random fluctuations 
may result that a particular technological option or trajectory gains momentum over competing 
ones, see in particular Arthur [68, 69] 
15 Of similar importance is coal, fueling the steam engine and railway Kondratievs ending with 
the Great Depression in the 1930s. 
16 OECD (1979) lnterfutures: Facing the Future, Mastering the Probable and Managing the 
Unpredictable OECD, Paris 
17 This is best illustrated by the fact that even present day global energy consumption could 
theoretically be met by the global wood reproduction rate 
18 For an illustrative discussion on how perceived major environmental concerns become resolved 
The fifth Kondratiev upswing: an emerging new growth phase 469 
due to the dynamics of technological change and efficiency improvements see Ausubel [38] 
19 Nakicenovic, N. (1986) Patterns of Change: Technological Substitution and Long Waves in 
the United States WP-86-13, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria 
20 Griibler, A. and Nakicenovic, N. (1987) The Dynamic Evolution of Methane Technologies 
WP-87-2, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria 
21 Rogner, H-H. (February 1988) 'Technology and the prospects for natural gas, results of current 
studies' Energy Policy pp. 9-26 
22 Goldemberg et al. [70] present estimates of per capita energy use for cooking purposes in a 
number of countries. In case of fuelwood use for cooking the energy requirements amount to 
around 400 W /year per capita corresponding to approximately 800 kg of firewood. The same 
service can be provided for instance by bottled gas, in which case the energy requirements 
are reduced to around 50 W/year per capita, due to the much higher efficiency and better 
controllability of stoves fuelled with modern energy carriers. 
23 Williams, R.H. and Larson, E.D. (1988) 'Aeroderivative turbines for stationary power' Ann. 
Rev. Energy Vol. 13, pp. 429-489 
24 A scenario based on a transition to a carbon-free (e.g. hydrogen-based) future energy system 
relying heavily on the natural gas option would result in carbon dioxide emissions and 
concentrations orders of magnitude lower than projected in conventional scenarios, as illustrated 
by Ausubel, Griibler and Nakicenovic [71]. 
25 Pry, R.H. (1988) 'The changing nature of industrial management' Draft, IIASA, laxenburg, 
Austria 
26 It has been noted, that the introduction of micro-electronics and computers in service activities 
like banking have up to now not resulted in significant labour productivity increases. This situation 
has been referred to as the so-called 'Solow paradox'. Certainly, this paradox may be the result 
of a more general measurement problem, in particular that conventional productivity measures 
fail to account for information inputs, in addition to labour, capital and energy (as argued for 
instance by Ayres [64]). There appear however two additional reasons for this development: 
first the introduction of new technologies enabled a quantum leap in the quality of service offered, 
ranging from automatic teller machines to access to new forms of financial instruments by a 
large public. Second, the productivity potential of new technologies could not be fully realised 
precisely because of the mismatch between the opportunities opened by new technologies and 
the (static) nature of the socio-institutional framework into which they are embedded. As an 
illustration of this point consider for instance the bank opening hours in most European countries. 
27 Jaikumar, R. (1989) Associate professor, production and operations management, Harvard 
Business School, Cambridge, Mass., private communication 
28 US National Academy of Engineering (NAE) (1988) The Technological Dimensions of 
International Competitiveness US NAE, Washington D.C. 
29 Guile, B. and Brooks, H. (eds.) (1987) Technology and Globallndustry, Companies and Nations 
in the World Economy National Academy Press, Washington D.C. 
30 Murayama, J.H. and Stever, H.G. (eds.) (1988) Globalization of Technology, International 
Perspectives National Academy Press, Washington D.C. 
31 Tani, A. (1987) International Comparisons of Industrial Robot Penetration WP-87-125, IIASA, 
Laxenburg, Austria 
32 Tchijov, I. and Sheinin, R. (1988) Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS), Diffusion and 
Advantages WP-88-29, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria 
33 It is indicative that software constitutes already presently a major fraction (above 803) in military 
investments. Similar tendencies are also to be expected for the manufacturing sector, as illustrated 
in Figure 3, taken from Ayres [64]. 
34 Williams, R.H., Larson, E.D. and Ross, M.H. (1987) 'Materials, affluence, and industrial 
energy use' Ann. Rev. Energy Vol. 12, pp. 99-144 
35 Griibler, A. (1987) 'Technology diffusion in a long wave context: the case of the steel and 
coal industries' Draft, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria 
36 Note that this observation does not imply a decrease in the total goods transport volume (i.e. 
in ton-km performed), rather it implies an increasing decoupling (or decreasing elasticity) of 
growth in transported volumes from GNP growth. 
37 For example, railroads were fired with wood in the USA well into the 1870s and by coal only 
thereafter; locomotives in Tsarist Russia were fuelled with mazout, i.e. (petroleum derived) 
470 A. Grabler and H. Nowotny 
fuel oil. The trans1t1on from steam to either diesel or electricity resulted in significant 
improvements of the energy efficiency (energy requirements per unit of traction power) of 
locomotives . 
38 Ausubel, J.H. (1989 , forthcoming) 'Regularities in technological development: an environmental 
view' in J.H . Ausubel and H.E. Sladovich (eds.) Technology and Environment US National 
Academy of Engineering, Washington D.C . 
39 French capital was for instance essential in the construction of the railway network of Austro-
Hungary and Tsarist Russia; the dominance of British engineering and capital in the construction 
of railways in Latin America or in India provides another illustrative example . 
40 Rostow, W .W. ( 1952) The Process of Economic Growth (2nd edition , 1960) W.W. Norton , 
New York 
41 This line of research was especially followed by the 'new economic history school' . Excellent 
quantitative assessments of the impact of railway development are for instance Fishlow [72] 
and Fogel [73] for the USA, Fremdling [74] for Germany or Hawke [75] for the UK. For 
assessments of social savings (ranging from 5 to 10% of GNP in industrialized countries to 
25-40% in case of Mexico) see for instance O'Brien [76] . 
42 The model considers the fractional growth achieved in relation to the maximum network size 
(the saturation level of the growth process K) at any particular time t, i.e. F, =Kly, (where 
K describes the maximum network size and y, the network size at time t) to follow the relation 
F,1(1-F,) = exp (at +b) . The growth achieved at time t thus depends on t and the two growth 
parameters a and b, describing the slope of the growth curve and its location in time. The 
fractional growth achieved over the fractional growth remaining to be achieved (i .e. F,1(1-F,)) 
if represented on logarithmic scale follows the linear growth model (at + b) and can thus be 
compared in terms of its dynamics between different countries , irrespective of the different 
ultimate saturation levels reached. 
43 Only the growth of the public railway network of the UK proceeds along an asymmetrical growth 
pattern, described more appropriately by an alternative diffusion model (a Gompertz curve) 
or the two-phase logit model as presented in Figure 10. 
44 A brief examination of the available statistics (Mitchell [60]) suggests that the countries in which 
the expansion of the railways (i.e. the completion of the diffusion of the railway bandwagon) 
is much larger than the examples analysed in Table 5 and Figure 10. Basically all European 
countries had reached their maximum length of the railway network in the 1930s, including 
the Netherlands (1929), Denmark (1932), Belgium (1933), Switzerland (1937), Sweden and 
Greece (1938) and finally Italy (1940). This provides thus further evidence for the clustering 
('season') of saturations hypothesis, formulated above. 
45 Consequently the global railway network has remained roughly constant at around 1.3 million 
km over the last 50 years . 
46 Because of the strong population dynamics of these countries, per capita densities show even 
larger disparities to industrialized countries and are also decreasing for most developing countries. 
47 This does not of course imply that developing countries should not construct any new railway 
lines. For the transport of low-value goods, say soy beans or iron ore, railways would b~ an 
efficient and cost-effective transport mode for these countries . Our conclusion just refers to 
the fact that we do not consider successful catching-up of these countries to rely in any similar 
way on the development of an infrastructure, which was essential for the growth of industrial 
countries in the 19th century. 
48 Nowotny, H. (1988) 'Long-term and short-term strategies for science and technology policies 
in developing countries', Paper prepared for the meeting of the International Council for Science 
Policy Studies, Paris, 24-25 March 1988. Draft, University of Vienna 
49 Brooks, H. (1988) 'Some propositions about sustainability' Draft, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, Mass 
50 Rosenberg, N. and Birdzell, L.E. (1986) How the West Grew Rich: The Economic Transformation 
of the Industrial World l.B . Tauris & Co. , London 
51 Shenhav, Y . (1987) 'Science in LDCs: connectedness versus universalism' Science and 
Technology Studies Vol. 5, No. 3/4, pp . 124-125 
52 Hill, C.S. (1986) 'The hidden agenda of science studies for developing countries' Science and 
Technology Studies Vol. 4, pp. 29-32. 
53 Salam, A. (1987) Ideals and Realities: Selected Essays World Science Publishing Co., Singapore 
The fifth Kondratiev upswing: an emerging new growth phase 471 
54 Salam, A. (1988) 'Science, high technology and development ', speech delivered at the conference 
of Nobel laureates, Paris, January 1988. The Third World Academy of Sciences, Trieste 
55 Of course in reality there ex ist also vast differences between countries aggregated withi n such 
a stylized bipolar regional aggregation. However, for the purposes of revealing a decisive 
structural difference in the share of science in technology expenditures in GNP compared to 
other type of expenditures, one may stay with such a crude regional aggregation. 
56 Perez , C. and Soete, L. ( 1988) 'Catching up in technology: entry barriers and windows of 
opportunity ', in G. Dosi et al . (eds.) Technical Change and Economic Theory Pinter Publishers, 
London and New York 
57 According to this particular viewpoint the emergence and full development of the technological 
trajectory, crucial for the industrial development in the period 1870 to 1920, was considerably 
hampered in the UK compared to the USA or Germany. 
58 CEDIGAZ (1985 and 1987) Natural Gas in the World CEDIGAZ, Rueil-Malmaison 
59 UN Energy Statistics ( 1987) UN, New York 
60 Mitchell , B.R. ( 1980) European Historical Statistics 1750-1975 2nd revised edition, Macmillan 
Press , London 
61 Woytinsky, W.L. (1927) Die Welt in Zahlen,fanftes Buch: Handel und Verkehr Rudolf Mosse 
Buchverlag, Berlin 
62 Mothes , F. (1950) 'Das Wachstum der Eisenbahnen ' Zeitschrift far Okonometrie Vol. I , pp . 
85-104 
63 Nakicenovic , N. (1987) Updated after N. Nakicenovic, 1986 [19], IIASA, Laxenburg , Austria 
64 Ayres, R.U. (1989) 'Technology forecast for CIM ' Manufacturing Review Vol. 2, No . 1, pp. 
43-52 
65 van Duijn, J.J . (1983) The Long Wave in Economic Life Allen & Unwin, London 
66 Vasko, T . (ed.) (1987) The Long-Wave Debate Springer Verlag , Berlin, Heidelberg 
67 Goldstein, J.S. (1988) Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age Yale University 
Press , New Haven and London 
68 Arthur, W.B. (1983) Competing Technologies and Lock-in by Historical Small Events: The 
Dynamics of Choice under Increasing Returns Center for Economic Policy Research Paper 
43 . Stanford University , Stanford 
69 Arthur, B. (1988) ' Competing technologies: an overview', in G. Dosi et al. (eds.) Technical 
Change and Economic Theory Pinter Publishers , London and New York 
70 Goldemberg , J ., Johansson , T .B., Reddy , A.K.N. and Williams , R.H. (1988) Energy f or a 
Sustainable World Wiley Eastern Ltd ., New Delhi 
71 Ausubel, J .H., Griibler, A. and Nakicenovic, N. ( 1988) 'Carbon dioxide emissions in a methane 
economy' Climate Change Vol. 12, pp. 245-263 
72 Fishlow, A. (1965) American Railroads and the Transformation of the Ante-bellum Economy 
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass 
73 Fogel, R.W. (1964) Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Economic History 
1970 edition, John Hopkins, Baltimore 
74 Fremdling, R. (1975) Eisenbahnen und deutsches Winschaftswachstum 1840-1879, ein Beitrag 
zur Entwicklungstheorie und zur Theorie der /nfrastruktur Gesellschaft fiir Westfiilische 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte E . V., Dortmund 
75 Hawke, G.R. (1970) Railways and Economic Growth in England and Wales 1840-1870 
Clarendon Press, Oxford 
76 O'Brien, P. (ed.) (1983) Railways and the Economic Development of Western Europe 1830-1914 
MacMillan Press, London 



